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ABSTRACT
This paper suggests that a new approach is needed in order to identify the causes
of the East Asian financial crises and that this new approach might be fruitful in
reassessing the analyses and theories of financial crises in emerging economies.
The first part of the paper presents a new empirical analysis of the state of
fundamentals in East Asia before the crises. It suggests that the relevant
fundamentals were both non-conventional and “intermediate” (or not “bad” enough
to trigger the crises by themselves). Fundamentals were also different from those
preceding previous turmoils in the 1990s, such as the ERM crisis in 1992-1993
and the Mexican crisis in 1994-1995.
The second part highlights that existing theoretical models of currency crises miss
some important points. Even second generation models, which stress self-fulfilling
expectations and which acknowledge that crises might appear against the
backdrop of non-conventional and intermediate fundamentals, explain only the role
of fundamentals in relation to private expectations. But they do not explain how
can it be that a shift in private agents’ expectations turns out into a financial crisis.
The third part suggests that the current process of globalization exacerbates
failures in international capital markets and impinges upon capital flows and the
pace and order of financial liberalization in emerging economies, increasing
therefore uncertainty and rendering large domestic vulnerabilities. It also highlights
how financial globalization was related to the East Asian crises.
The main conclusion is that intermediate non-conventional fundamentals, shifts in
private agents’ expectations and financial globalization were arguably the main
factors of the East Asian crisis. Therefore, in order to prevent future financial
crises, governments in emerging economies should try to exit crises zones
through improving their fundamentals, to proceed carefully with financial
liberalization, to implement some kind of capital controls and to urge for the
establishment of a new global financial architecture.
Keywords: currency and financial crises, East Asia, financial liberalization, models
of currency crises, economic and financial globalization.
JEL Classification: F30, F32, F33, F43, G15.3
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The East Asian crises (1997-1999) have been the third severe episode of financial
crises in the current decade. After the ERM crisis in 1992-1993 and the Mexican
crisis in 1994-1995, the East Asian crises erupted in 1997 and brought about
immediately a large controversy about their causes. Some experts have
highlighted the importance of unsound fundamentals in causing the East Asian
crises. Some others have stated that a financial panic triggered such crises. Let us
note that the former strand of thought sticks to an explanation of crises from a
domestic point of view, while the latter approaches the issue from the point of view
of the functioning of the international financial system. This paper suggests, first,
that the fundamentals identified by many analysts are not the most important ones
when explaining East Asian vulnerability; and second, that the dichotomy between
fundamentals and financial panic as causes of crises is, in fact, a false one. We
believe that it is necessary to study both the domestic deficiencies that permit the
success of speculative attacks, and the international context which facilitates the
existence of such attacks.
In our empirical analysis of the macroeconomic situation of the East Asian
countries affected by the financial crises (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
South Korea and Thailand), we find out that these economies featured sound
conventional fundamentals in a favorable international environment. However, this
group of countries also recorded some non-conventional deficiencies. A premature
and indiscriminate financial liberalization and a weak supervisory framework
contributed to the entry of massive capital inflows which, in turn, led to three types
of economic deficiencies: increasing balance of payments constraints, the
appearance of financial fragilities, and productive problems reflected in an asset
bubble and in a decrease in investment efficiency. However, these factors did not
seem to be “bad” enough to trigger the crises by themselves. Besides, if we
compare the East Asian crises to previous episodes we can conclude that there
were substantial differences between them: the ERM crisis was the result of
excessively tight monetary policies; the Mexican crisis was associated to
overconsumption problems; and the East Asian episodes were mainly related to
overinvestment. Thus, as fundamentals were both “not-so-bad” and new relative to
previous turmoils, the East Asian crises were not predicted.
As to the theoretical analysis, we firstly survey some of the existing models of
financial crises and, secondly, we assess if those models fit to the empirical
analysis of the East Asian episode. First generation models view crises as the
unavoidable and predictable result of the incompatibility between economic
policies. We will see that East Asian crises can not be explained by this kind of
models. Second generation models view crises as the consequence of self-
fulfilling expectations, so that crises are contingent and non-predictable
phenomena. Though every concrete second generation model misses some part6
of the reality of the East Asian episode, they explain how the East Asian crises
happened despite that fundamentals were not as “bad” as to trigger a crisis by
themselves, and that despite they were different to those considered as dangerous
following previous crises. Finally, contagion models show that a crisis in one
country may be the cause of crises in other countries. Contagion (at least some
kinds of contagion) can partially explain the spreading of the initial Thai crisis to
the rest of the region.
The severity of the East Asian financial crises has renewed the interest on the
impact of financial globalization in emerging economies. Moreover, second
generation models suggest that the prevailing international financial system
permits the self-fulfilling character of expectations. Therefore, we study how the
current financial globalization process brings about an increase in the vulnerability
of emerging markets to crises. Such vulnerability arises from two different (albeit
sometimes related) channels. First, globalization enhances the inherent failures of
capital markets, leading to an increase in uncertainty. Second, globalization
impinges upon the pace and order of domestic financial liberalization of emerging
markets and facilitates the massive flow of capital to such markets, leading to
domestic financial vulnerabilities. The East Asian countries suffered an increase in
financial vulnerabilities through both channels. Therefore, these vulnerabilities,
resulting from financial globalization, together with “intermediate” fundamentals
and to a shift in private expectations, led to the East Asian financial crises.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents what we think is, in some
important ways, a new empirical analysis of the East Asian crises. It shows the
non-conventional fundamentals which made the East Asian countries prone to a
financial crisis, and it analyzes the similarities and differences between the East
Asian crises and previous turmoils in the 1990s. Section II reviews the literature on
theoretical models of currency crises and assesses the explanatory and predictive
capacity of those models in the case of the East Asian experience. Section III
deals with the main features of the current process of financial globalization and
suggests that such process leads to an increase in international uncertainty and
domestic financial fragility, and ultimately, to a growing vulnerability of emerging
markets to crises. Furthermore, it shows the usefulness of such analysis for
understanding the causes of the East Asian crises. Finally, references include a
large list of what we believe is the main literature (books, articles, working papers
and typescript documents) on the East Asian crisis, the theoretical models of
currency crises, and the effects of financial globalization on emerging markets. A
statistical appendix can be found at the end of the paper, with some of the main
relevant data.
Although this is a collective work which has been reviewed, in its integrity, by the
three authors, we decided to distribute earlier drafts in the following way: initial
writing of section I was made by Pablo Bustelo; Clara García wrote the first draft of
section II; and Iliana Olivié was in charge of section III.7
We sincerely hope that this paper might be useful as a modest contribution to the
ongoing academic debate on the analysis and prevention of financial crises in
emerging economies. Researchers are kindly requested to send to us their
eventual comments.
Madrid, October 19998
I. THE EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISES (1997-1999): A NEW
ANALYSIS
1
A. Features and Development of the Crises
A.1. Main features of the crises
Despite somewhat alarming developments in 1996 in some of the later-troubled
economies
2, the East Asian financial crises (note the use of plural) in 1997-1999
were unanimously unpredicted. Academic specialists on currency crises, financial
analysts, debt-rating agencies, and even the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), failed to predict not only the crises but
also any kind of major economic or financial disturbance
3. This was
understandable to a certain extent. In fact, the background in 1990-1996 of the
later distressed Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South
Korea and Thailand, Asia-5 thereafter) featured generally sound conventional
macroeconomic fundamentals
4: high savings and investment rates, robust growth,
moderate inflation, fiscal surpluses or low deficits, limited public debts, substantial
foreign exchange reserves, and apparently sustainable high net capital inflows.
                                                       
1 Analyses of the crises can be found in several books: Agénor et al. (eds.) (1999),
Hunter and Kaufman (eds.) (1999), Jackson (ed.) (1998), Jomo (ed.) (1998), Lee
(1998), and McLeod and Garnaut (eds.) (1998). Recent important papers are
Corbett and Vines (1999), Chowdury (1999), Das (1999), Glick (1998), Griffith-
Jones et al. (1999) and McKibbin and Martin (1998). See previous references in
Bustelo (1998 and 1999).
2 See, for instance, the 1997 Report of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS,
1997), which stated, however, that these developments were not an indicator of a
full-fledged crisis.
3 A notable exception was Korean economist Park Yung-chul. See Park (1996).
4 Kaminsky et al. (1998) review many empirical studies on fundamentals which
have featured unsoundness before episodes of financial crisis. They consider that
ten of such fundamentals are relevant: international reserves, real exchange rate,
domestic credit, credit to the public sector, domestic inflation and, to a lesser
extent, trade balance, export performance, money growth, real GDP growth and
the fiscal deficit. Just one of these ten “conventional” fundamentals (credit growth)
was unsound in every East Asian country before the crises erupted. Other three
(real exchange rate, trade balance and export performance) were unsound in
some East Asian countries before the crises. Nevertheless, non-conventional
fundamentals, such as investment efficiency, short-term external debt as a
percentage of foreign exchange reserves, and the rise of bank credit to GDP, were
far from sound (see below).9
The international economic and financial environment was also benign:
reasonable growth in the advanced economies (except Japan in 1997), low
interest rates in developed countries (especially in Japan), high growth in
international trade, and stability in world commodity markets. The crises came
then as a total surprise. Also unanticipated were their deep impact and their
prolonged duration.
The East Asian turmoils have been also heterogeneous. On the one hand,
Southeast Asia has suffered from a balance-of-payments crisis
5, although with
distinctive features respective to similar episodes in the past, such as the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism’s crisis in 1992-1993 and the Mexican crisis
in 1994-1995 (see a comparison in section I.C below). Southeast Asia’s crises
featured also several important distinctions between each of the countries
concerned
6. On the other hand, South Korea’s economy did not suffer initially from
a balance-of-payments crisis but only from liquidity problems of domestic banks
and companies (and not from severe currency overvaluation and/or a high current
account deficit), which were associated with overinvestment and excessive
external debt accumulation, but finally had to face also sharp international
solvency difficulties.
Besides, the East Asian crises have been tremendously controversial, both as
respect to the explanations offered by analysts and specialists and as regards to
the solutions implemented by the IMF in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea or,
against the tide, by Malaysia.
Moreover, due to the importance of East Asia in the world economy, the global
impact of its crises was significant. For instance, the world was on the brink of a
global recession in mid-1998, while several other developing and transitional
regions (Brazil, Argentina and Russia) were affected and most of the developed
economies are still suffering from the trade impact of the East Asian crises. The
regional impact of the crises was of course more pronounced. The Asia-5
economies have witnessed stockmarkets’ plunges and exchange rates’ collapses
(from mid-1997 to mid-1998), widespread financial sector difficulties (which are still
severe), protracted declines in economic activity (in 1998 and early 1999), and a
sharp increase in unemployment and poverty.
A.2. Development: a chronology of the crises
In mid-May 1997, a massive attack on the Thai baht and the Filipino peso was
launched. Thailand (with the help of Singapore) intervened selling US dollars,
while the Philippines increased its interest rate. On 2 July the baht was allowed to
                                                       
5 A result of large currency overvaluations and/or massive current account deficits.
6 For instance, Malaysia did not feature a large currency real appreciation, while
Indonesia did not suffer from a high current account deficit.10
float (it devaluated by 18%) and the Thai government asked the IMF for “technical
assistance”. This was the trigger of the subsequent currency crises in East Asia. A
generalized floating of the currencies occurred in less than six months: Philippines
(11 July), Malaysia (14 July), Singapore (17 July), Indonesia (14 August), Taiwan
(18 October) and South Korea (16 December).
Before giving up on defending the exchange rate pegs, central banks tried several
measures to reduce the pressure: massive selling of US dollars, widening of the
ranges of currency movements, increasing overnight borrowing rates and liquidity
reserve requirements, restricting lending windows, swap restrictions, opening of
bond markets to foreigners, etc.
On 24 July a new currency meltdown occurred. In late-July Thailand called in the
IMF, which unveiled a rescue package of US$ 17.2 billion on 11 August. During
August, Malaysia limited swap transactions in ringgits and banned short-selling of
stocks (the latter was scrapped, after much criticism, on 4 September).
On 8 October, Indonesia asked the IMF for assistance. In late-October, after the
floating of the New Taiwan dollar, speculative attacks on Hong Kong’s stockmarket
and currency board redoubled. In 23-24 October, the Hang Seng index had lost
23.3% of its value in just four days. This provoked a “minicrash” in Wall Street: on
27 October, the Dow Jones lost 7.2% and trading was temporarily suspended. On
31 October, the IMF announced its rescue program to Indonesia, which involved
US$ 38 billion (later augmented to US$ 41 billion).
After widening the won trading band from +/-2.25% to +/-10%, on 21 November
South Korea announced it would also seek a rescue package from the IMF. After
the endorsement of the Vancouver APEC summit on 26 November (as the leading
institution leading with the Asian turmoils), the IMF unveiled its program for South
Korea on 3 December (for an unprecedented amount of US$ 57 billion).
However, difficulties in South Korea continued to grow. On 10 December, Seoul
announced that its foreign exchange reserves had diminished from US$ 30.5
billion at end-October to US$ 23.9 billion in early-December, of which only US$6
billion were “usable”. Moreover, it stated that its short-term foreign debt (previously
of US$ 63 billion) amounted in fact to US$ 100 billion.
Pressures on the currencies continued, despite the IMF interventions. The
Indonesian rupiah surpassed the 5,000 mark to the US dollar on 12 December
(2,682 on 13 August). The Korean won depreciated from 979 to the US dollar on 7
November to 1,710 on 12 December and 1,995 on 23 December. The Philippine
peso reached 39.77 to the US dollar on 17 December (35.61 on 1 October).
This was surely related to the strong criticism directed to the IMF-sponsored
programs, which involved measures such as a sharp fiscal and monetary11
tightening, closure of troubled banks, reduction of subsidies, deregulation of
monopolies and opening up of the financial system. This policy-mix was
interpreted as to have recession-inducing effects.
In early 1998, runs on the currencies continued (the rupiah surpassed 10,000 on 8
January and 12,000 on 22 January). On 21 May, President Suharto resigned. In
June, after the yen reached an 8-year low of 139 to the US dollar, the US and
Japan intervened to strengthen the Japanese currency, mainly for fears that, if
allowed to depreciate further, China might have envisaged to devalue the
renminbi.
In July, the Asian contagion accelerated Russia’s difficulties. Despite a IMF
agreement with Moscow on 13 July, the ruble was floated on 17 August (a
depreciation of 50% followed), while Russia declared a 90-day moratorium on the
repayment of its foreign debt.
In early September, Malaysian authorities, departing from IMF prescriptions,
applied currency and stockmarket controls and pegged the ringgit to the dollar at
an exchange rate of 3.8. Meanwhile, the crisis spread to Latin America. On 10
September, Brazil’s stockmarket plunged, while the Mexican peso depreciated.
On 29 September, the US Federal Reserve, fearing a global recession, decreased
its interest rates. Meanwhile, Japan unveiled a fiscal stimulus to revive its
economy. On 1 October, Tokyo announced the “Miyazawa Plan”, a rescue
package of US$ 30 billion for the ailing East Asian developing economies.
As a result of these developments, the crises provoked large currency
depreciations, enormous stockmarket plunges and an outright (and also
unpredicted in late 1997) recession in 1998 (table I.1).
Table I.1. GDP changes in Asia-5, 1996-1998
1996 1997 1998 1998f*
Indonesia 8.0 5.0 -13.7 2.0
Malaysia 8.6 7.8 -6.8 2.5
Philippines 5.7 5.1 -0.5 3.8
South Korea 7.1 5.5 -5.8 3.5
Thailand 6.7 -0.3 -8.0 0.0
* IMF forecasts in December 1997
Source: IMF.12
B. The Background: The East Asian Economies in 1990-1996
B.1. Generally sound macroeconomic conditions
All the East Asian developing economies featured in 1990-1996 both domestic and
foreign sound macroeconomic conditions.
On the domestic front, they had low public deficits - or even budget balances or
surpluses (table 1.1 in the appendix); low public debts (table 1.2); moderate
inflation (table 1.3); high savings and investment rates (over 30% of GDP in Asia-
5, except in the Philippines) (table 1.4); robust GDP growth (8% in 1986-1996)
(table 1.5); high and apparently sustainable (seen as “benign” as they financed
investment rather than consumption) net capital inflows (6% of GDP in 1990-1996)
(table 1.6); and low unemployment (table 1.7).
Internationally, interest rates in the US and especially in Japan were low (table
1.8); GDP growth was reasonably high in the advanced economies (except Japan)
(table 1.9); world commodity markets were stable (table 1.10); and world trade
growth averaged 6% in 1990-1996 (table 1.11).
As a conclusion, “none of the macroeconomic fundamentals suggested that a
crisis of the magnitude that occurred was imminent in Asia” (Glick, 1998, p. 10).
B.2. Weaknesses: the seeds and the onset of the crises
Despite this apparently confortable domestic and international macroeconomic
environment, which contrasted, in several aspects, to those of some Western
European countries before 1992-1993 (Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, and
the Nordic economies) and of Mexico before 1994-1995, virtually all Asia-5
economies presented simultaneously several weaknesses.
High capital inflows
The East Asian economies undertook, since the early 1990s, a process of rapid
financial liberalization, including both domestic deregulation and capital-account
opening.  As regards to domestic deregulation, barriers to entry in the financial
sector were eliminated while old and new financial institutions obtained more
freedom in their borrowing and lending decisions (these measures increased the
number of financial institutions and their range of activities); restrictions on
corporate debt financing were lifted; and regulatory controls over interest rates and
loans were loosened, in benefit of a more market-based monetary and credit
policy. According to capital-account opening, virtually all restrictions on cross-
border borrowing were eliminated.13
Financial deregulation and opening contributed to high capital inflows (see again
table 1.6), which were also the result of low interest rates in the advanced
economies (especially in Japan) and, domestically, to the high-growth and high-
yield environment, and the stability of the nominal exchange rates
Balance-of-payments constraints
High capital inflows led to currency real appreciation (table 1.12). The rise of the
US dollar (table 1.13) since the spring of 1995, respective to the Japanese yen
(and most European currencies), also contributed to this appreciation, as the
Asian countries had a dollar-pegged exchange rate regime. From 1990 to the
spring of 1997, real effective exchange rates (REERs) increased 30% in Hong
Kong, 23% in the Philippines, 19% in Malaysia, 18% in Singapore, 12% in
Thailand, 8% in Indonesia, but decreased 14% in South Korea and 10% in Taiwan
(Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998)
7.
The appreciation of Asia-5 currencies contributed to an important slowdown in
merchandise exports and, subsequently, to an increase in current account deficits,
which therefore stemmed mainly from large trade imbalances, especially in
Thailand and Malaysia.
The loss of competitiveness due to currencies’ real appreciation, together with the
entry of low-cost producers (such as China) in international sectors displaying
global excess supply, with a glut in semiconductors, and with the reduction in
import propensities of growth in advanced economies in 1994-1995, provoked a
slowdown in exports (table 1.14). Moreover, as the value of the US dollar
increased from 85 yen in June 1995 to 127 yen in April 1997 and to 135 yen in
December 1997, Japanese direct investment in the area and its market for Asian
products contracted (this was also due to Japan’s recession), while Japan
increased its competitiveness outside Asia respective to its regional competitors
(mainly South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia). In 1996 the growth rate of
total exports decreased markedly in Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia.
However, Indonesia and the Philippines suffered a less important decline.
As a result, current account deficits (as a percentage of GDP or exports) reached
considerable high levels in Malaysia and Thailand, but they were also sizable in
the Philippines and South Korea (table 1.15). Only Indonesia had a reasonable
current account deficit. On the contrary, Singapore, Taiwan and China had current
account surpluses.
                                                       
7 Other estimates indicate real appreciations in all five economies (see table 1.12).
For instance, for the World Bank (1999: table 2.5), real exchange rates increased,
from June 1995 to June 1997, 20.0% in the Philippines, 16.1% in Thailand, 14.0%
in Indonesia, 9.3% in Malaysia, and 2.5% in Korea.14
Declining efficiency of investment
Financial deregulation and large capital inflows led to a boom in bank credit to the
private sector (table 1.16). The large increase in bank lending contributed to
overinvestment, which was already underway (table 1.17).
Overinvestment, together with important increases in unit labor costs, provoked a
decline in capital profitability and investment efficiency in several manufacturing
sectors in the early 1990s. This decline is shown in three facts: (1) the investment
rate rose from 1986-1990 to 1991-95 while average GDP growth decreased from
around 10% in 1986-1990 to around 8% in 1991-1995 (see country-by-country
data in table 1.17); (2) the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) increased in
manufacturing sectors (table 1.18). For instance, from 1987-92 to 1993-96, the
ICOR increased in Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea; and (3) returns on assets,
according to estimates from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998: table 1),
diminished, in the corporate sector, from 1992 to 1996, 2.6 percentage points in
Thailand, 2.1 points in Indonesia, 0.8 points in South Korea and 0.4 points in
Malaysia. Only the Philippines featured an increase (2.0 points).
Increased financial fragility
As a result of the indiscriminate and under-regulated liberalization, financial
institutions entered new areas of business and domestic firms became free to
borrow both domestically and abroad. As a result, the quality of risk-assessment
was reduced, while foreign exposure (to both interest and exchange rate risk)
increased, due to the liberalization of the capital account, to the interest rate
differential, and to the pegged currency (which virtually eliminated the perceived
exchange risk). Foreign borrowing in short-term funds denominated in foreign
currencies contributed, along with increased competition in the domestic banking
sector, to an excessive bank lending on a long-term basis (and in domestic
currency). As a result, balance sheets in banks and other financial institutions
featured a growing maturity and currency mismatch between liabilities (borrowing)
and assets (lending). In the case of bank borrowing, obtaining capital from abroad
(at low interest rates on a short-term basis) to lend in the domestic market (at high
interest rates on a long-term basis) was profitable and therefore contributed,
besides to the aforementioned maturity mismatch between liabilities and assets, to
a substantial short-term foreign debt. In the case of bank lending, due to increased
competition in the domestic market, most banks tended to direct their loans to the
stock market and to commercial and residential property, and thus contributed to
create an asset bubble in those sectors. For instance, low rental yields in office
buildings in central business districts reflected the boom in real estate. Moreover,
stock indexes in the property sector rose more than general stock indexes. Banks
behave quite rationally, as lending to consumption was not profitable due to high
private savings and as lending to manufacturing was affected by declining returns.15
Financial liberalization proceeded in a context of inadequate governmental
regulation and prudential supervision (Singh, 1998). Low capital adequacy limits
and high legal lending limits contributed to bank overlending (or to firms’
overborrowing), while limited disclosure requirements and inadequate asset
classification systems disguised the extent of problems related to non-performing
loans.
As regards to the domestic financial fragility, East Asian banks and non-bank
financial institutions (NBFIs) managed their risk inadequately. Excessive risk-
taking was a result of the real or perceived financial insurance they had from the
government (the so-called moral hazard), the entry of NBFIs in new and unknown
areas of business, their high foreign exposure (which increased both their interest
rate and exchange rate risks), and their practice of widespread collateralized
lending. As a result, many banks were undercapitalized
8.
Financial liberalization in a context of inadequate regulation and prudential
supervision was the main factor explaining this behavior. Indicators of this financial
fragility were:
• overlending: the change in bank lending to the private sector as a proportion of
GDP (see again table 1.16);
• high foreign exposure: foreign liabilities of domestic banks as a proportion of
GDP (table 1.19), and also as a proportion of M2 or as a percentage of assets
(see World Bank, 1999a: table 2.2);
• high real estate exposure: percentage of banks loans directed to the property
market (table 1.20);
• inadequate bank sheets: rate of non-performing loans (table 1.21).
East Asian manufacturing firms had an easy access to credit. As a result, they
were highly leveraged (table 1.22) Both borrowing respective to investment and
debt respective to equity were abnormally high. Moreover, there was also a
declining capital efficiency and a falling profitability of investment.
Both banks and firms were also overindebted in foreign short-term liabilities, while
the change in foreign exchange reserves was not matching the latter. Indicators
are short-term debt as a proportion of total debt (table 1.23); short-term debt as a
proportion of foreign exchange reserves (table 1.24), which measures the external
liquidity; and the ratio of broad money (M2) to foreign exchange reserves (table
1.25), which is a proxy for the potential demand for foreign currency by holders of
domestic currency.
                                                       
8 However, banks’ capital-asset ratios were at the end of 1996 between 6% and
14% and between 15% and 18% in the Philippines, according to Corsetti, Pesenti
and Roubini (1998).16
Summary
In short, the essential process which led to rising vulnerabilities in East Asia might
be summarized as follows (see also the figure in page 17):
• financial liberalization contributed, along with interest rate differentials and the
exchange rate pegs, to substantial net capital inflows (US$ 220 billion in Asia-5
in 1990-1996), most of which were short-term bank loans or portfolio
investments;
• high net capital inflows provoked a currency real appreciation, due also to
differentials in inflation rates and to the US dollar rise, which led to slowing
exports. Exports were also affected by a cyclical overproduction in
semiconductors (which affected mainly South Korea and Malaysia), by the
stagnation of the Japanese economy, and by the entry of low-cost producers
(there was a shift of regional trade advantages towards China). Slowing
exports contributed to an increase of current account deficits, which rose 1 to 2
points of GDP in 1995-1996 in the later troubled Asian economies;
• the upsurge in capital inflows, together with financial deregulation, provoked
also an overextension in bank lending, which created an asset bubble, a
reduction in asset quality, and greater laxity in risk-assessment in borrowing
and lending decisions. Overlending contributed to overinvestment by private
firms, which, as a result, faced a decline in capital profitability and investment
efficiency;
• financial deregulation increased fragilities in the domestic financial sector:
excessive risk-taking, high domestic and foreign exposure, inadequate bank
sheets, maturity and currency mismatch between borrowing and lending, and
short-term external debt (also by private firms).17
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The onset of the crises
Two main factors aggravated the situation in 1996 and early 1997. First, an
increased financial fragility, due to growing domestic vulnerabilities in both banks
and firms, combined with an overindebtedness in foreign liabilities (mostly short-
term, private, denominated in foreign currencies and unhedged). Second, a slight
macroeconomic worsening in 1996 and early 1997, due to slowing exports and
declining profitability, which led, for instance, to several important bankruptcies in
South Korea in the first half of 1997.
As regards to financial fragility, foreign liabilities of deposit money banks reached
at the end of 1996 (as a proportion of GDP) 27% in Thailand, 17% in the
Philippines and 9% in South Korea (a substantial increase from 11%, 6% and 4%,
respectively, at the end of 1993). Moreover, debt-to-equity ratios in the corporate
sector raised from 1995 to 1996 in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (see
again table 1.19). Furthermore, short-term foreign debt (as a proportion of
international reserves) increased markedly in Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea
between June 1994 and June 1997, according to Radelet and Sachs (1999).
Concerning the cyclical downturn, a slight macroeconomic worsening became
apparent in 1996, related especially to a slowdown in export growth and to a
deterioration in the current account. Moreover, in 1996 and early 1997, the bubble
in the real estate sector burst in Thailand and there was also a decrease in
stockmarkets’ indexes in Thailand and South Korea (table 1.26). This contributed
to the aforementioned bankruptcies in South Korea during the first half of 1997.
However, with insight, a soft landing, through slowing domestic demand and
depreciating gradually the currency, would have been possible. Currency
appreciation was smaller than in pre-crisis Mexico (Palma, 1998) and also than in
several Latin American economies at the time (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). Exports
were still rising in 1996 (except in Thailand) at considerable, although declining,
rates. The current account deficit was high only in Malaysia, Thailand and the
Philippines, but not in Indonesia and South Korea.
The increased financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities in 1996 and early 1997
certainly aggravated some unsound features of the Asia-5 economies.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, even this aggravation could have been
corrected in the absence of the speculative attacks on the currencies and the
stockmarkets that took place since June 1997. The reversal of capital flows was
very substantial (table 1.27).19
C. A New Kind of Crises
C.1. Financial crises in the post-Bretton Woods period
Financial crises are defined here in a narrow sense. They should include, at least,
four main elements: (1) a significant and unwanted depreciation of the currency;
(2) a large drop in stockmarket indexes; (3) serious difficulties in the domestic
financial system; and (4) a reversal of GDP growth, towards much lower positive
rates or to negative rates.
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, several
financial crises, especially in emerging economies, have erupted in:
• the Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) in 1981-
82;
• virtually all Latin America, during the debt crisis in 1982-1990;
• Western Europe, as the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European
Monetary System (EMS) suffered a turmoil and a breakup in 1992-1993;
• Mexico, in 1994-1995;
• East Asia, in 1997-1999.
An important feature was that all post-Bretton Woods crises were preceded by an
upsurge in net private capital inflows. Capital flows were attracted in all cases by
three main pull-factors. First, important interest rate differentials between capital-
importing economies and capital-exporting countries. However, in the Southern
Cone, Western Europe (Italy, Spain and the UK) and Mexico, the differential was
related to tight monetary policy in the capital-recipient countries, while, in Latin
America and East Asia, it was mainly due to very low international interest rates.
Second, financial market deregulation and capital-account opening. Third, an
exchange rate policy aimed at maintaining stability in the nominal exchange rate.
The nature (composition, maturity and borrowers) of those flows was nevertheless
different in each case (table I.2).20
Table I.2. Composition, maturity and borrowers in upsurges of capital
inflows since the late-1970s.
Composition Maturity   Borrowers
Southern Cone  Individual bank Short-term   Private
lending
Latin America Syndicated bank Medium-term   Public
loans
Western Europe Portfolio Short-term    Private
investments
Mexico Portfolio Short-term    Private/Public
investments
East Asia Bank lending Short-term    Private
Source: Author.
In all cases, massive capital inflows led to two alternative or combined effects:
a) if not sterilized (causing then an increase in the domestic-currency
monetary base), to currency nominal appreciations and a worsening of external
payments (a rise in the current account deficit and in the foreign debt). The change
in the real exchange rate towards greater appreciation, due also to inflationary
pressures, tended to attract even more capital flows;
b) if sterilized (in order to maintain unchanged the monetary supply), central
banks had to issue domestic debt, which in turn increased domestic interest rates
and the fiscal deficit. Normally, the central banks tended to use the domestic
currency obtained by the issue to acquire foreign exchange in international
markets. The increase in both interest rates and foreign exchange reserves
attracted more capital inflows, as the interest-rate differential tended to rise and as
the increase in reserves assured the stability of the exchange rate.
This process seemed to create a virtuous circle of long-lasting increases in capital
inflows. However, these inflows normally contributed to currency real appreciations
(and, therefore, to balance-of-payments constraints), to an overextension in bank
lending, and to financial difficulties: a rapid increase in asset prices (that is, a
bubble in the non-tradable sector); a decline in the quality of assets; and a greater
laxity in risk-assessment by domestic banks and other financial institutions.
Therefore, large capital inflows were related in all cases (except in the ERM
episode) to banking crises (IMF, 1998).
However, developing countries handled capital inflows in different ways. In general
terms, possible responses to massive capital inflows can be described as follows
(Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998):21
1. STERILIZATION: central banks engage in open market operations (and/or they
impose higher reserve requirements in the banking system or they shift
government deposits to the central bank) to offset some (of all) of the monetary
expansion associated with the higher reserves, as they accumulate foreign
exchange reserves to avoid some (of all) of the ensuing currency nominal
appreciation. Open market operations include selling of treasury bills or central
bank paper. As a result, the predictability of the near-term value of the currency,
together with higher interest rates, lead to an increase in the volume of short-term
capital inflows. It should be noted that central banks tend to prefer open market
operations, as higher reserve requirements increase the burden on the banking
sector and provoke some financial disintermediation.
2. EXCHANGE-RATE POLICIES: a devaluation of the currency (a measure which
is normally rejected as it has adverse effects on inflation) or, at least, a higher
exchange rate flexibility.
3. FISCAL POLICIES: in order to lower aggregate demand, governments may
choose to tighten fiscal policies, but this choice may collide with long-term needs
for infrastructure development in low-income countries.
4. CAPITAL-ACCOUNT MEASURES: such as taxing short-term inflows, improving
prudential regulation on cross-border borrowing, or liberalizing capital outflows.
The empirical evidence tends to suggest that developing countries, in order to
avoid some of the adverse impacts of maintaining the currency peg, choose
sterilization. Moreover, the comparison of several Latin American economies
before the Asian crises leads to several conclusions: (1) sterilization of capital
inflows should avoid the issue of large short-term government debt, especially if
denominated in foreign currency (Chile versus Mexico); (2) flexibility on exchange
rate policies is better than credibility, even if it provokes a somewhat higher
inflation (Eichengreen and Fishlow, 1998), as pegged currencies tend to lead to
currency real appreciation and have moreover a limited usefulness over time to
fight inflation (Chile versus Mexico and Argentina); (3) the use  of capital controls
on short-term capital inflows is, at least temporarily, useful (again Chile versus
Mexico and Argentina); (4) some fiscal restraint might be necessary (idem).
Table I.3 summarizes policy responses to large capital inflows in several Latin
American economies in 1994 and in Thailand in 1996.22
Table I.3. Policy responses to large capital inflows in several Latin American
economies in 1994 and in Thailand in 1996
Mexico94 Chile94 Argentina94Thailand96
Fiscal restraint NO YES NO YES
Currency revaluation NO YES NO NO
More ER variability NO YES NO NO
Sterilization YES YES NO YES
Capital controls NO YES NO YES
Lib. of capital outflows YES YES NO YES
More trade liberalization YES NO NO YES
Source: Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998, table 4.10, p. 122.
The three main episodes of financial crises in the 1990s (the ERM crisis of 1992-
1993; the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995; and the East Asian crises of 1997-1999)
deserve special attention.
All were preceded by an upsurge in capital inflows, due to rapid financial openings,
exchange-rate pegs, and interest-rate differentials. Capital inflows contributed to a
currency real appreciation and/or to an overextension in bank lending.
The three 1990s episodes share some similarities. First, they have been related,
much more than previous episodes, to the growing globalization of the world
economy
9, especially as regards to the trend towards higher capital mobility (e.g.,
increase in inflows and vulnerability to sharp reversals). Second, the ERM and
Mexican crises have inspired the so-called second-generation models of currency
crises, which, describing the turmoils mainly as self-fulfilling events, prevail in the
current theoretical literature and seem also to explain partially the East Asian
crises (see section II of this paper).
C.2. The ERM crisis (1992-1993)
The crisis in 1992-1993 of Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European
Monetary System (EMS) was a new kind of financial turmoil. In contrast with the
Latin American episodes of the late-1970s and the 1980s, the European crisis
was, to a great extent, a self-fulfilling event (see section II.B below). As Krugman
(1997) suggested, “the European countries attacked in 1992 and 1993 did not fit
the [first-generation] canonical crisis model at all”. Governments retained access
to foreign capital, so they did not have to monetize their public deficits.  Therefore,
later-troubled economies did not feature an exceptionally rapid growth of domestic
                                                       
9 For an analysis of the links between globalization and financial crises, see
Kahler, ed. (1998), Bustelo and Olivié (1999) and section III of this paper.23
credit nor they had a priori limitations on foreign exchange reserves. Moreover,
they had low and stable inflation rates both before and after the crisis. The ERM
crisis was virtually unanticipated by financial markets: interest differentials against
deposits in the later targeted currencies did not begin to widen until August 1992,
only one month before the breakup of the system.
The results of the ERM crisis are very well known: the exit of the Italian lira and of
the British pound from the EMS in September 1992; recurrent speculative attacks
against the French franc in late 1992 and in 1993; and several devaluations of the
Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo and the Irish punt from September 1992
to July 1993. Finally, on early August 1993, the size of currency bands in the EMS
was widened from 4.5% (+/- 2.25%) to 30% (+/- 15%), epitomizing the collapse of
an entire exchange-rate system of pegged currencies (Buiter, Corsetti and
Pesenti, 1998).
The crisis reflected the inherent weakness of national anti-inflationary policies
based on pegging the exchange rate and the vulnerability of the policy-makers’
commitment to exchange rate stability. It has been explained as a result of some
policy-induced weak fundamentals in the EMS zone since the late 1980s but
especially following Germany’s reunification, and as a product of massive
speculative attacks against several currencies in the area.
Since 1987, several high-growth and high-inflation economies (such as Italy, Spain
and the UK) had pursued tight monetary policies to contain prices’ increases,
creating large interest-rate differentials with the rest of Europe (particularly
Germany) and with the US. This attracted large capital flows, which appreciated
the currencies and provoked large current account deficits.
Moreover, in the aftermath of its reunification Germany undertook large fiscal
transfers to its Eastern region, which fueled domestic demand, increased the
budget deficit and created inflationary pressures (wages had also featured an
upward trend, following monetary unification). In order to keep inflation at bay, the
Bundesbank, sticking to its traditional tight monetary policy, raised interest rates at
a time when other European countries (and also the US and Japan) had to lower
their rates to get out of recession. In mid-July 1992, Germany’s monetary
authorities increased the discount rate from 8% to 8.75%, in a context of declining
rates in the US and Japan (average short-term rates in 1992 were 9.4%, 4.1% and
3.4%, respectively). Germany attracted substantial capital flows (especially from
the US, as the interest rates differential surpassed 500 basis points) which
appreciated the D-Mark (it reached a historical high rate towards the dollar during
the summer).
The D-Mark appreciation should have provoked in other EMS-member countries
either an exchange rate realignment (a devaluation) or further deflation-oriented
policies, both to regain competitiveness. However, policy makers in Italy, the UK,24
Ireland, Spain and Portugal, confronted to high unemployment and pressured to
engage in expansionary policies, decided to maintain the pegs they had with the
D-mark, mainly for fears of the domestic inflation cost of the eventual realignment,
and refused to increase sharply their interest rates.
After the first Danish referendum (which rejected the Maastricht treaty) and with
uncertain expectations regarding the French consultation, speculative pressures
on the lira and the pound increased during the summer. In early September, Italy
decided to increase its discount rate, while the Bank of England opted to
accumulate foreign exchange reserves. After the Finnish markka (which had a peg
with the Ecu) was floated on 8 September and despite a slight decrease in
German interest rates, the sterling and the lira withdrew from the EMS on 16
September, while the peseta was devalued by 5%. Pressures mounted on the
franc, the peseta and the escudo. The latter were both devalued again by 6% on
22 November, amidst the floating of the Swedish and, later, the Norwegian kronas
(which also had a peg with the Ecu). In January 1993, the Irish punt was devalued
by 10%. Germany reduced its interest rates in February, March and April to defuse
tensions, but in May both the peseta and the escudo were devalued by another
6.5%. Finally, on 2 August 1993, the size of the currency bands in the EMS
widened from 4.5% to 30%, putting an end therefore to the previous system.
In short, the ERM crisis might be explained by the following main factors.
First, pegged currencies featured substantial real appreciations following the
upwards movement of the D-Mark, due to higher interest rates in Germany in a
context of slow growth in the US and Japan;
Second, relatively loose fiscal policies and tight monetary policies in several
European countries before the crisis were counterproductive. Inflationary
pressures precluded fiscal stimuli while relatively high domestic interest rates were
maintained in order to fight inflation and especially to attract the foreign capital
needed to finance the current account deficit. Large capital inflows, spurred also
by capital account opening after the Single Act, contributed to currency real
appreciations while high interest rates discouraged investment and job creation.
When the crisis began in mid-1992, “other European countries pegging to the
Mark found themselves obliged to match the tight monetary policy without the
fiscal expansion [of Germany]; thus they were pushed into recession” (Krugman,
1997).
Third, massive speculative attacks (Bartolini and Prati, 1998) on the pound, lira,
punt, escudo and peseta, on the ground that, in the aforementioned context, those
currencies could have been defended only through a very sharp monetary
contraction, which policy makers rejected on domestic political and economic
considerations.25
Therefore, the ERM crisis was in fact a result of pegged exchange rates,
appreciated currencies, financial liberalization and herding behavior by
international capital markets. These four features were to be found later also in the
Mexican and the East Asian crises.
C.3. The Mexican crisis (1994-1995)
Similarly to several European economies in 1992, Mexico was not suffering from
especially adverse conventional fundamentals in the early 1990s (and more
precisely in 1994, see Sachs et al., 1996a). It featured a low public deficit (only
0.5% of GDP in 1994
10); a reasonable inflation rate (at least by Mexican
standards) of 8% in 1993 and 7% in 1994; and a consistent monetary policy (the
growth of M1/GDP was only 1.1% per year in 1992-94).
However, the Mexican economy had also several important weaknesses (Calvo
and Mendoza, 1996; Espinosa and Russell, 1996; Palma, 1998):
• a large current account deficit (6.8% of GDP in 1993; 8% of GDP in 1994,
which amounted to 38% of exports), due to an important peso overvaluation
and to a decreasing savings rate. According to Palma (1998), the peso
appreciated in real terms almost 62% between 1987 and 1994. In the two
years preceding the crisis, the currency appreciated, in real terms, 13.1%
(Esquivel and Larraín, 1998)
11. The appreciation was a result of the currency
peg, some inflation differential with the US (3 percentage points in the tradable
sector in 1990-93), and the large capital inflows that the country received (US
$91 billion in 1990-93, many of them with short-term maturities - only 13% was
in the form of direct investment in 1993). The private savings rate declined from
26.1% in 1984-90 to 13.8% in 1991-93, while the investment rate increased
from 16.5% to 19.5% (Palma, 1998). As a result, the current account deficit
rose from US$ 14.6 billion in 1991 to US$ 28.8 billion in 1994;
• a substantial short-term private and public foreign indebtedness, mainly dollar-
denominated, as a result of the issue of foreign debt instruments by private
financial and manufacturing companies and of government dollar-indexed
bonds (tesobonos). This was the result of the need to finance the external
deficit but also of an indiscriminate and premature capital account opening;
• an inadequate regulation and supervision of the domestic financial system,
which had been recently liberalized. Liberalization included, as in East Asia in
1990-96, measures directed to reduce reserve requirements, to increase
                                                       
10 Although this figure might be higher (to perhaps 4% of GDP) if funds raised and
lent by state and development banks are included. However, Mexico had budget
surpluses from 1990 to 1993.
11 This appreciation was roughly similar of that of Southeast Asia in the 24 months
preceding the 1997 crisis: 17.7% in the Philippines, 15.5% in Thailand, 12.8% in
Malaysia, and 12.1% in Indonesia, although much larger than that of South Korea
(4.4%), according to Esquivel and Larraín (1999).26
access to offshore borrowing and to remove restrictions on corporate debt
financing and barriers to entry in the financial system. Inadequate oversight
provoked excessively risky bank loans (bank credit, as percentage of GDP,
doubled between 1990 and 1994) and growing asymmetries in maturity and
currency structures between foreign borrowings and domestic loans;
• a high vulnerability to reversals in capital flows, following the aforementioned
features and the six-step increase in US Fed funds rates during 1994 (from
3.0% in January to 5.5% in late-November). In fact, net transfer of resources
from abroad declined from US$22 billion in 1993 to minus US$ 2 billion in 1995
and to minus US$13 billion in 1996, a swing equivalent to 10% of GDP (Palma,
1998);
• political instability, following the Chiapas rebellion in January 1994 and the
assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March, in a
context of an election year;
However, those weaknesses were not necessarily conducive to the currency crisis
which unfold later on. Self-fulfilling attacks by international investors (see the
mechanics of this behavior in section II.B below) were in fact the main trigger of
the Mexican crisis. As a result of speculative selling on the peso, foreign exchange
reserves declined from US$29 billion in January 1994 to US$ 16 billion in April-
October and to only US$6 billion in December. Finally, on 22 December, Mexico
allowed the peso to float freely. The currency lost 40% of its value between 20
December 1994 and 15 January 1995. A protracted recession followed, as GDP
fell 7% in 1995 and as the unemployment rate increased from 4% to 7%.
C.4. A comparison of the three crises
An interesting prolongation of the previous analyses is to compare the East Asian
crises with the ERM and Mexican turmoils
12. In all three episodes, financial
liberalizations, currency pegs and interest-rate differentials led to high capital
inflows. As already described, the entry of large amounts of foreign capital
exacerbated balance-of-payments constraints, lending booms and financial sector
fragilities. Nevertheless, the three episodes were essentially different.
The European battered economies in 1993 featured much lower GDP growth and
investment and savings rates than East Asia before 1997. They had also much
higher unemployment rates. Besides, in the ERM case interest rates in Germany
were high, while in 1996-97 US and Japanese rates were low. Fiscal policies were
relatively loose in pre-1993 Europe while East Asia featured virtually balanced
budgets. Monetary policy was tighter in the UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland
in 1992 than in Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia in 1996 or than in South Korea in
                                                       
12 Krugman (1997) compares the three crises. Esquivel and Larraín (1999), Hale
(1998), Kregel (1998), Ortiz (1998) and Palma (1998) deal with the Mexican and
East Asian crises.27
1997. The European countries did not present dangerous levels of short-term
private foreign debt.
Turning now to the common features of the ERM and East Asian crises, these
were pegged exchange rates, substantial real currency appreciation, low inflation
rates (although they were higher in some European countries), large current
account deficits (7% of GDP in Spain in 1992; 8% in Malaysia and Thailand in
1996, although only 2% in South Korea in 1997), previous rapid financial
liberalizations, and adverse effects from herding and speculative behavior in
international capital markets.
Despite striking similarities
13, the East Asian crises were essentially different from
the Mexican turmoil three years before. To begin with, Mexico was in 1994 in the
midst of an exchange rate-based stabilization program, which was the main
reason why the nominal exchange rate was stable. Moreover, the government
undertook, since the early 1990s, a widespread privatization process.
Furthermore, a speculative boom in the stockmarket was under way. All these
factors, combined with very low interest rates in the US, attracted considerable
capital flows to Mexico (which amounted to 10% of GDP in 1993).
If one compares Mexico in 1994 with Thailand in 1996 (Hale, 1998), other
differences in the pre-crisis economic environment were the following:
• savings and investment rates: 10% and 25%, respectively, in Mexico, and 35%
and 44%, respectively, in Thailand;
• foreign exchange reserves: as a percentage of the current account deficit, they
represented 95% in Mexico and 300% in Thailand;
• composition of foreign capital inflows: mainly portfolio investment in Mexico,
and mainly bank loans in Thailand;
• inflation rates: 12.9% in Mexico (1990-1993) and 5.5% in Thailand (1994-
1996);
• external environment: high interest rates in the US in 1994; low interest rates in
Japan and other advanced economies in 1996;
• political situation: instability in Mexico; stability in Thailand.
Table I.4 summarizes the comparison between the three financial crises.
                                                       
13 Large current account deficits, significant currency real appreciation, and
lending booms. However, current account deficits were a result of private
overconsumption in Mexico and of private overinvestment in East Asia.28
Table I.4. A comparison between the ERM, Mexican and East Asian crises
ERM MEXICO EAST ASIA
International int. rates High* Low Low
Fiscal policy Loose Cautious Cautious
Monetary policy Tight Tight Cautious
Exchange rate Pegged Pegged Pegged
Real appreciation Yes Yes Yes
Inflation rate Low Low Low
Investment rate Low Low High
Savings rate Low Low High
Current account deficit High High High**
Short-term foreign debt No Yes Yes
Financial liberalization Yes Yes Yes
Financial panic Yes Yes Yes
Political stability Yes No Yes
Notes: *: Germany’s rates; **: Except South Korea and, to a lesser extent,
Indonesia.
Source: Author.
The main conclusion of this section might be laid out as follows. The main
currency crises in the 1990s were related to previous high net capital inflows, due
to financial opening, interest-rate differentials and exchange-rate pegs. However,
the ERM crisis was a result of excessively strict monetary policies firstly in the
European periphery and later in Germany; the Mexican crisis was associated to a
decline in the private savings rate (that is, to overconsumption); and the East
Asian crises were related to private overinvestment.
Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that none of those problems should have
necessarily been conducive to a full-fledged currency crisis. Some other factors
need to be explored, such as the behavior of international capital markets and the
impact of the recent trends in financial globalization (see sections II and III below).29
II. Theoretical Models of Currency Crises and their Applicability to
East Asia
A. First Generation Models
First generation models appeared with an article published by Paul Krugman in
1979. Krugman’s article was inspired in a previous model (Salant and Henderson,
1978) which explained why and when the government reserves of an exhaustible
resource, whose price has been fixed, are depleted. Krugman, in turn, explained
why and when the foreign currency reserves, given a fixed exchange rate regime,
are depleted. The resemblance between both models is obvious: while Salant and
Henderson (1978) study the behavior of the reserves of an exhaustible resource
when there is a fixed price for such resource, Krugman (1979) studies the
behavior of foreign currency reserves when there is a fixed exchange rate regime
(when the foreign currency price is fixed). Krugman (1979) considered, as we see
below, that crises are the consequence of financing the public deficit through an
expansionary monetary policy.
Other first generation models are the following: Flood and Garber (1984)
developed a linear model with the aim of estimating the exact timing of the
speculative attack and of the consequent depletion of reserves. Connolly and
Taylor (1984) calculated the timing of a collapse when there is a crawling peg
regime. Their main contribution was the study of the behavior of prices of
nontradeable goods before the collapse of the exchange rate regime: the currency
appreciates and the current account deteriorates before the collapse. Dooley
(1997) presented a first generation model in which the fundamentals that lead to
the crisis are different to those included in previous models. Dooley, contrary to
the previous first generation models, considered that crises are the consequence
of the mismatch between the amount of reserves that the central bank holds and
the amount of liabilities guaranteed by the government.
It is important to explain why all these models are joined together in the same
group. Although there is consensus in the specialized literature about exactly what
models are first generation models, it seems adequate to intend to give a definition
of what we consider a first generation model. We believe that the main features of
a first generation model is that it considers that financial crises are unavoidable
and predictable phenomena, and that they are consequence of the incompatibility
of some economic policies with others. According to this definition, Krugman’s
model and those of his followers, are first generation models, as crises in those
models are the unavoidable and predictable consequence of the incompatibility of
fiscal and monetary policies with the exchange rate policy. Dooley’s model is also
a first generation model, as it presents crises as the consequence of the
incompatibility of a contractive credit policy with the public insurance of national
residents’ liabilities. If we had considered exclusively the policy incompatibility30
showed in Krugman (1979), we would have excluded Dooley’s (1997) model,
which is a good example of the efforts that can be made in order to widen the
explanatory (and even predictive) capacity of first generation models.
A.1. The first model
The first model was presented by Paul Krugman in 1979. As we have already said,
it was based in Salant and Henderson (1978). Such model presents the following
explanation: fixing the price of an exhaustible resource (e.g. gold) forces the
authority to defend such price through selling gold, and the sale of gold would end
up in the depletion of gold reserves. Before the total depletion of reserves, private
agents perceive that the maintenance of the fixed price is not possible and that
after the depletion of reserves the gold price would rise discretely. As a
consequence, they buy the remaining reserves of gold, before its price rises. Thus,
a speculative attack advances the depletion of gold reserves, that otherwise would
be reached progressively.
Krugman’s model consists in applying Salant and Henderson’s model to the
currency market. While in the latter the government fixes the price of gold, in the
former the government fixes the price of the foreign currency. Krugman defines a
balance of payment crisis as the moment in which “the government is no longer
able to defend a fixed parity because of the constraints on its actions” (Krugman,
1979, p. 311). Such crisis occurs because fiscal and monetary policies are
incompatible with the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate. Let us study
carefully such incompatibility.
The model is based in the following assumptions
14:
1. There is purchasing power parity, and international prices are constant and
equal to one, so that the national price level equals the exchange rate, and
expected inflation (p) equals expected devaluation (s);
2. There are two financial assets, domestic money (M) and foreign money (F), and
while domestic agents distribute their wealth between both assets according to
their inflation expectations (p), foreign agents have no access to domestic money;
3. The monetary authorities can only defend the fixed parity through intervention in
the currency market;
4. Money supply increases are exclusively settled by the public sector’s financing
needs, and not by an increase in the credit given by the monetary authorities to
the banking system
15;
                                                       
14 There are more assumptions that we do not specify in the text. Those we
include are the most relevant ones so as to make the explanation of the model
understandable.
15 Krugman admits this possibility but does not include it in his model. In any of
both cases (the increase of money supply in order to finance public deficit or to31
5. The only way of financing public deficit is precisely turning to the central bank,
and not, for example, issuing public debt;
6. Speculators’ forward-looking behavior is “sophisticated”. Thus, there is perfect
foresight, which implies that p  = DP/P.
Let us see what happens under these assumptions when the government
implements a fixed exchange rate regime and bears a budget deficit at the same
time. On the one hand, according to assumption number 5, the public deficit must
be financed by issuing money, that is, by an increase in money supply. On the
other hand, while private agents believe in the maintenance of the fixed parity the
expected devaluation and the expected inflation (that are identical, according to
assumption number 1) equal zero. Being expected inflation equal to zero,
according to assumption number 2, the proportion of wealth that domestic agents
want to keep in domestic money (M) and the proportion they want to keep in
foreign money (F) remain constant. Thus, on the one hand, money supply is rising,
due to the public sector’s financing needs, and on the other hand, money demand
is constant. Private domestic agents will exchange the money supply excess for
foreign currency in the central bank in order to preserve the proportion of wealth in
domestic and foreign money (M and F) they had chosen for the given expected
inflation. In consequence, the central bank looses reserves.
If such fiscal and monetary policies persist, there will be a time in which foreign
currency reserves are depleted. But before reserves are totally depleted, there is a
speculative attack against the domestic currency. Why is it so? In order to
understand it, let us see what would happen if there was no speculative attack.
The depletion of reserves would be reached progressively, as we have just
explained. When reserves are exhausted, increases in money supply can not be
exchanged for foreign currency in the central bank anymore, so that “portfolio
balance begins to determine the price level instead of the money supply”
(Krugman, 1979, p. 319). The price level will immediately begin to rise.
According to assumption number 6 (perfect foresight), the increase in the price
level turns immediately into an increase in expected inflation (p). Such increase in
the expected inflation reduces the proportion of wealth that private domestic
agents are willing to keep in domestic money. Thus, the money demand falls and
the price level (that equals the exchange rate, according to assumption number 1)
rises by a discrete amount. Hence, inflation and devaluation come about after the
depletion of reserves in absence of an speculative attack.
While private agents believe that reserves are not going to be exhausted, and that
the fixed parity can be maintained, inflation expectations remain zero, so that
money demand does not change. But there is a moment in which private agents
                                                                                                                                                                       
finance the banking system’s needs), the money supply increase would have
identical consequences in this model.32
realize that reserves are decreasing, that such losses would lead to the exhaustion
of reserves, that such exhaustion would produce inflation and devaluation, and
that such inflation and devaluation would bring about losses for those private
domestic agents that keep part of their wealth in domestic money. In such a
moment, expected inflation rises, money demand decreases, and domestic
currency is exchanged for foreign currency so as to avoid the losses that the
foreseen depletion of reserves would bring about. Hence, a speculative attack is
under way.
This model, apart from explaining why a speculative attack occurs before the total
exhaustion of reserves, indicates the exact time of the attack. Nevertheless, this
matter is more thoroughly studied in subsequent models. Krugman (1979) just
explains that the attack comes about whenever the price level that would be
reached after the depletion of reserves equals the fixed price. In other words,
when the exchange rate that is expected to prevail after the abandonment of the
fixed parity equals the fixed exchange rate, there is a speculative attack. Being this
way, there is no discrete jump neither of prices nor of the exchange rate, so that
there are no losses for private domestic agents. The bigger  the amount of
reserves in the central bank, the later the timing of the speculative attack.
Hitherto, it has been assumed that government policy is not uncertain, so that
private agents know what amount of reserves is the central bank inclined to use
for the defense of the fixed rate. Krugman also studies the case in which there is
no such certainty. In this case private agents know that the central bank is
determined to use an amount of reserves (R1) but they do not know if it will use
another amount (R2). It is also assumed that once the central bank has began to
use R2, it is inclined to use the whole amount of R2. In the case of a speculative
attack against R1, if the central bank decides to use R2, the collapse of the
currency may be avoided. Nevertheless, as private agents know that the central
bank is determined to deplete the whole R2, there may be a second speculative
attack. Hence, if there is uncertainty about the amount of reserves that can be
used for the defense of the fixed parity, there may be a succession of speculative
attacks.
Summing up, public deficit theoretically could be financed through increasing the
money supply (monetization) or through wasting currency reserves. The main idea
of Krugman’s model is that, if there is a fixed parity, even when the deficit is
financed through an expansive monetary policy, reserves will be lost. This is so
because private agents have an optimum portfolio composition, so that they
exchange the excess of money supply (produced by the money supply increase,
being money demand constant) for foreign currency in the central bank. If fiscal
and monetary policies (public deficit and expansive monetary policy) persist, there
would be a time in which reserves would be depleted. Private investors advance
such depletion through a speculative attack that allows them to avoid the losses
that otherwise they would suffer because of the collapse of the exchange rate33
regime and the consequent devaluation. When the attack depletes the
international reserves, the authorities can no longer defend nor maintain the fixed
parity.
A.2. Other first generation models
We are now going to study some variations of the first model. It is important to
note that we do not have the aim of listing or explaining here all first generation
models, but to give some examples of the work that other authors have developed
in this area of study.
Many of the variations on Krugman’s model are very similar to it. Both the
variables (public deficit, increasing money supply...) and the mechanisms that lead
to the crisis (financing of deficit that brings about the loss of reserves) are mainly
the same in these models and in Krugman’s one. Nevertheless, they may differ
from the first model in various things: in the mathematical method used, in the
main objective of the study, in the behavior of domestic credit, in the prevailing
exchange rate regime, etc. Apart from these variations, that are more or less loyal
to the first model, there are some other attempts to explain financial crisis in which
the variables and the mechanisms that lead to the crisis are different from the
previous models. In any case, as we have already stated, all of them coincide in
that crises are the unavoidable and thus predictable consequence of the
impossibility of maintaining a certain combination of economic policies.
Nevertheless, some of the contributions reviewed here include, apart from the first
generation model in which we focus our attention, other models that should
normally not be included in this group of models, as we note below.
Flood and Garber (1984) present two models, following Krugman (1979). We
focus our study in the first one, which estimates the exact time of the collapse,
under the assumption, already made by Krugman, that there is perfect foresight.
The first model in Flood and Garber (1984) is based in the following
assumptions
16:
1. Money supply (M) equals the book value of international reserves (R) plus
domestic credit given by the central bank (D). So that M = R+D;
2. Domestic credit (D) grows at a constant rate (m);
3. There is perfect foresight.
This model does not specify if such domestic credit growth rate is determined by
the public sector’s financing needs. In any case, when the exchange rate is fixed,
the government has to prevent domestic credit growth (D) becoming an increase
in money supply (M). If money supply grew, given that money demand is constant
                                                       
16 As we did for Krugman, we only list the assumptions that are more important for
understanding the model.34
(because it is determined by the exchange rate, which is constant), a money
demand-supply gap would arise, so that the domestic currency would loose value.
In order to avoid such loss of the domestic currency’s value it is necessary to
prevent the money supply from growing by sterilizing the domestic credit growth
(DD = m) with an equivalent reduction in international reserves (DR = -m). It is
obvious, thus, that while domestic credit keeps growing, reserves will be lost at the
constant rate m, so that there will be a moment in which international reserves are
exhausted (R = 0). In such moment, according to assumption number 1, money
supply equals domestic credit (M = D), so that it is not possible anymore to prevent
the increases in domestic credit turning into increases in money supply. Therefore,
the fixed parity has to be abandoned.
The collapse of the exchange regime, as in Krugman (1979), does not come along
when foreign exchange reserves progressively reach a minimum (usually zero).
Instead, a speculative attack advances the collapse. Private agents foresee the
collapse and its consequences (the discrete jump of prices and of the exchange
rate), so that they demand foreign currency in order to avoid the losses such jump
of the exchange rate would bring about for them. Flood and Garber define the
shadow floating exchange rate as “the floating rate which would materialize if the
fixed exchange rate collapsed at any given time” (Flood and Garber, 1984, p. 4).
The moment of the attack is when this shadow floating rate equals the fixed
exchange rate. When the shadow rate is higher that the fixed rate, private agents
compete for the profits of buying foreign currency before the collapse (before the
price of the foreign currency increases), so that the attack is advanced. When, on
the contrary, the shadow exchange rate is lower than the fixed rate, private agents
win nothing by buying foreign currency (as it would be cheaper if the fixed parity is
abandoned), so that there is no speculative attack. In sum, as Krugman (1979)
indicated in other words, the attack comes whenever the shadow floating
exchange equals the fixed exchange rate. The higher international reserves are,
and the lower domestic credit growth (m) is, the latter the attack comes
17.
Connolly and Taylor (1984) develop a model in which, instead of a fixed exchange
rate regime, there is a crawling peg regime. A crawling peg regime consists in that
the monetary authorities preannounce a constant rate of change for the exchange
rate. “A fixed exchange rate is a specific case of an active crawling peg where the
preannounced rate of change in the exchange rate is zero” (Connolly and Taylor,
1984, p. 194).
                                                       
17 There is a second part of the model that studies the case in which the floating
exchange rate includes an arbitrary positive constant that is only known in the
moment of the attack. They conclude that the higher such constant, the sooner the
attack. Hence, they conclude that the solution to the floating rate depends not only
on fundamentals, but also on the arbitrary behavior of speculators. Therefore,
such part would not be included in first generation models.35
The main assumptions of the model are the following
18:
1.Money supply (M) equals international reserves (R) plus domestic credit (C in
this model). So that M = R+C;
2.Private agents have access to two financial assets: domestic currency (M) and
foreign currency (F). The proportion of wealth they will to keep in each currency
depends on the exchange rate;
3.The exchange rate grows at a constant rate g, preannounced by the monetary
authorities;
4.Domestic credit grows at a rate g+e.
Given such a depreciation rate, private agents preserve their portfolio balance by
increasing the domestic money demand at a pace g. When e is not zero, but a
positive constant, this is to say, when domestic credit growth is higher than the
exchange rate growth
19, the rate of money demand growth (g) is not enough as to
absorb all the money supply growth (g+e). As in previous models, in order to avoid
the effects on the exchange rate of the money demand-supply gap, it is necessary
to loose international reserves, according to the central bank balance sheet,
showed in assumption number 1. In other words, reserves must decrease at a
pace e (DR = -e) in order to sterilize partially the domestic credit growth (DC =
g+e), so that the money supply increases at the same pace that money demand
(DM = g).
Before international reserves are totally depleted, there is a speculative attack
against the domestic currency. With such attack, as we have already studied in the
previous models, private agents avoid the losses that the depletion of reserves
and the consequent discrete jump of prices and of the exchange rate would bring
about. Following this model, the attack comes sooner the greater the sensitivity of
money demand respective to the expected inflation, the greater the difference
between domestic credit growth and the exchange rate growth (the greater e), and
the smaller initial stock of international reserves relative to domestic credit.
This model also studies the behavior of relative prices during the crawling peg
regime. For such analysis they assume, as Krugman (1979), that the government
finances its expenditures exclusively through the creation of money. Their
conclusion is that there is a rise of the price of nontraded goods relative to traded
goods whenever e > 0 (whenever the domestic credit growth rate exceeds the
currency depreciation rate). Such rise is dramatically reversed at the moment of
                                                       
18 Once again, we only list the assumptions that we consider necessary for
understanding this brief explanation of the model.
19 Note that this is always the case in the previously explained models, in which
the exchange rate growth was zero (using the notation of this model, g = 0), and
the domestic credit growth rate was m > 0 (in the notation of this model, e = m  >
0).36
the collapse of the crawling peg. The increasing relative price of nontraded goods
to traded goods during the peg may bring about the worsening of the current
account
20.
The last model we study in this section differs quite a lot from the other first
generation models, especially in the fundamentals that cause the crises. If we
think that it can be placed here is because it coincides with the others in that there
is an economic policy conflict that leads to a worsening of the economic
fundamentals, and that private agents are informed and rational (not as in second
generation models, as we see below), so that their expectations depend on such
worsening of fundamentals. The conflict of economic policies that Dooley presents
consists in the following: the government on the one hand implements a restrictive
credit policy with the aim of holding reserves as a form of self-insurance; and on
the other hand it guarantees the financial liabilities of domestic residents. Both
objectives depend on the same economic policy instrument: the management of
international reserves. Let us see all this more carefully.
Three conditions must be met for a financial crisis to occur following this model:
the government must have positive reserves; it must be believable in its
commitment to use them for insuring the residents’ liabilities; private investors
must have access to those transactions that may produce insured losses. The
process that leads to a crisis consists in the following: firstly it is necessary that a
binding constraint is relaxed so that the central bank can accumulate assets
21.
Thus, the two first conditions we have mentioned can be met (the central bank
accumulates reserves and these are enough as to believe in the governments
insurance to residents). Once the central bank has enough assets and that the
insurance policy is credible, expected returns on insured assets rise for a
predictable time period. Such increase in profitability, all together with financial
liberalization and with a slackly regulated banking system, attracts foreign capital.
While insured assets have no risk, there are no incentives for a speculative attack.
But when insured liabilities equal international reserves, the expected profitability
of assets fall, as there is risk of the central bank’s default. Therefore, investors
exchange their assets for foreign currency in order to avoid the losses they would
suffer if the resident borrower did not pay and the central bank could not pay
either. Hence, there is a speculative attack that depletes international reserves.
                                                       
20 A final part of the article (Connolly and Taylor, 1984, p. 204) studies the case in
which there are no incompatibilities between economic policies, but the economy
is subject to a real external shock (e.g. a hurricane). Their conclusion is that if the
shock does not deplete all the international reserves, the collapse of the exchange
rate regime does not occur.
21 The author gives an example of the relaxation of a binding constraint: the
reduction of international interest rates in 1989. Such reduction lowered the price
of external debt of developing countries, which implied a capital gain that could be
set aside for insuring the residents’ liabilities.37
Summing up, the first economic policy objective is fulfilled by accumulating
reserves. Such accumulation of international reserves plus the insurance to the
residents’ liabilities attracts foreign capital to the country in question. Once
reserves equal the insured liabilities, investors foresee a possible government
default. Hence they suddenly remove their credit to the country through a
speculative attack.
Dooley considers that a fixed exchange rate regime is not a necessary condition
for crisis to happen, but that it helps by assuring that the government is more likely
to honor its contingent liabilities rather than using inflation or default to reduce their
value. Another important conclusion of this model is that, in a context of financial
liberalization, scarce regulation in the banking sector, and institutional guarantees,
rapid growth of credit from the banks to the private sector may serve as an
indicator of a future banking crisis, and a consequent financial crisis.
A.3. Evaluation of first generation models
First generation models show how certain incompatibilities between economic
policies provoke the worsening of fundamentals, and how such worsening of
fundamentals warn the investors about possible losses, thus bringing about a
speculative attack. Let us see some theoretical advantages of these models, as
well as the main critiques they have received. We will also review if the empirical
studies about first generation models support or not the theory.
From a macroeconomic perspective, an obvious advantage of these models is that
they attempt to find a causal explanation for financial crisis. This is, they do not
confine themselves to describe the economic context that increases the probability
of a crisis (as second generation models do, see below), but they try to find the
economic context that causes a crisis. Hence, they pretend not only to serve as an
ex post explanation of crises, but also to be able to explain them ex ante, that is, to
predict them. This attempt is, of course, laudable. But we must note that maybe it
is just an attempt. We consider that it may not be possible to elaborate a simple
model that can explain and predict phenomena as complex and uneven as
financial crisis have proved to be.  
From a microeconomic perspective, they have the advantage that they show that a
rational behavior of private agents can transform small changes in fundamentals
into massive attacks and severe crises. Dooley states that first generation models
(and thus, also his model) teach “the important lesson that rational economic
behavior driven by fundamentals that evolve smoothly over time can involve
dramatic attacks (...) and changes in regimes that seem to be unrelated to
contemporaneous changes in fundamentals” (Dooley, 1997, p. 5).38
Obstfeld states that “models in the spirit of Krugman (1979) provide elegant
parables of how rational financial markets respond to unsustainable
macroeconomic policies. The models ignore, however, the policy options available
to authorities and the ways in which the marginal costs of exercising these options
are balanced” (Obstfeld, 1994, p. 196). Actually, first generation models depict a
too mechanical government behavior. In fact, governments have other options
apart from sterilizing domestic credit growth with international reserves losses (or
from setting aside all its international reserves for insuring liabilities, as in the case
of Dooley). Second generation models acknowledge such fact and turn the
government into an optimizing agent (see below).
Likewise, Lahiri and Végh (1997) point out that governments are able to control
their reserves through their control of money demand. That is, they do not think
that governments accept passively that money demand stays constant while
international reserves are being lost. They develop a model in which the
government pays an interest rate to commercial banks’ reserves, and in which
variations in such rate imply variations in the deposits interest rate. Thus, if the
government rises the interest rate of banks’ reserves, the banks will rise the
interest rate of deposits, so that money demand will rise. Hence, the money
demand-supply gap (that, following Krugman, 1979, arises from the increase in
money supply, and that brings about the exchange of domestic currency for
foreign currency, and the consequent loss of international reserves) is avoided.
This model defends, in other words, that an expansive monetary policy plus a fixed
parity are not a sufficient condition for a financial crisis to occur.
Apart from the behavior of the government when defending the peg, there are
other elements in first generation models which are not realistic. For example,
Flood et al. (1996) observe that governments do not permit the sudden and
discrete loss of reserves that, following first generation models, occurs in the
moment of the attack. In some cases, as in Mexico in 1994, reserve losses were
sterilized in order to avoid a sudden fall in the monetary base. Secondly, if reserve
losses are in fact sterilized in the moment of the attack (e.g. by buying bonds) first
generation models are inconsistent with the perfect foresight assumption. This is
so because if reserve losses are going to be sterilized in the moment of the attack,
the shadow exchange rate is always higher than the fixed exchange rate. Hence,
the attack would be immediate to the implementation of the fixed parity regime.
Let us now study the empirical evidence in favor and against these models. There
are many empirical studies that intend to know how economic variables (and
sometimes also political or institutional variables) behave before financial crises
erupt. If regularities in the behavior of some variables are found, such regularities
could be used as indicators of the proximity of a crisis. We do not seek to take all
the existing studies into account. Instead, we have made a selection of some of39
the most quoted
22. We do not seek either to go deeply into the details of such
studies (the different methodologies used, the different ways in which they define a
crisis, etc.) but just to display their main results.
For first generation models (leaving aside Dooley, 1997) to be supported by
empirical evidence it would be necessary that those regularities previous to the
crises are: (1) small amount of foreign currency reserves and the loss of foreign
currency reserves; (2) public deficit; (3) credit to the public sector; and (4)
domestic credit growth relative to money demand growth (a money demand-
supply gap). For assessing the empirical support to the model of Connolly and
Taylor (1984) it would be also be necessary to observe if there is (5) currency real
appreciation (a fall in price competitiveness) and (6) current account deficit before
the crises. For Dooley’s model to have empirical support it is necessary that there
are institutional guarantees, financial liberalization, weak banking regulation, net
capital inflows, and credit expansion before the crises.
The studies coincide in that financial crises arise when (1) international reserves
are low (in absolute terms or relative to a measure of broad money, usually M2).
We must note that studies say that, before crises, reserves are low, but most of
them say nothing about if reserves are also decreasing, as it is supposed to
happen according to first generation models. Esquivel and Larraín (1998) are an
exception: they study the annual evolution of reserves respective to GDP and
conclude that when such ratio falls the probability of a crisis rises. As regards to
(2) public deficit, there is less empirical support for such variable than for low
international reserves. Anyway, the results of Kaminsky et al. (1998) provide some
support for it. (3) Credit to the public sector receive ample support as an indicator
of currency crises. Finally, regarding to (4) domestic credit relative to money
demand, there is no consensus: Frankel and Rose (1996) consider that crises
happen when, inter alia, there is a high level of domestic credit; on the contrary
Kruger et al. (1998) consider that domestic credit is not a significant variable.
Kaminsky et al. (1998) find that domestic credit growth relative to money demand
(measured as the evolution of the money demand-supply gap) is not usually tested
in empirical studies, so it is difficult to conclude anything about this variable.
Regarding to variables related to the country competitiveness, many studies agree
in that there is (5) an appreciation of the currency before financial crises. On the
contrary, not every study give the same importance to (6) current account deficits:
for example, Sachs et al. (1996b) and Kruger et al. (1998) conclude that it is not a
significant variable, while Esquivel and Larraín (1998) consider that it is. Kaminsky
                                                       
22 Specifically, we take into account (for this and also for the other sections) the
following studies: Sachs et al. (1996b); Frankel and Rose (1996); Glick and Rose
(1998); Esquivel and Larraín (1998); Kruger et al. (1998); and Kaminsky et al.
(1998), which examines 25 previous empirical studies.40
et al. (1998) conclude that there is not enough empirical support for such
variable
23.    
Thus, though there are some elements in first generation models that have
empirical support (a low level of international reserves or currency real
appreciation), there are others, such as current account deficits, that do not.
“There is no clear relationship between crises typical of emerging markets and
“the” fundamentals because first generation models focus on the wrong set of
fundamentals” (Dooley, 1997, p. 7). Let us see if Dooley’s fundamentals are more
supported than the conventional ones. Credit expansion is widely supported by
empirical studies (Sachs et al., 1996; Kruger et al., 1998; Kaminsky et al., 1998
24).
Institutional guarantees, financial liberalization, banking regulation and net capital
inflows are not sufficiently tested so as to obtain any conclusion. Anyway, it is
observable that all the crises reviewed in section I of this paper were preceded by
net capital inflows favored by financial liberalization.
We may conclude that there are very few variables which are sufficiently tested
and considered significant by empirical studies. The ones related to first
generation models are reserves relative to M2, real exchange rates, some
measure of competitiveness (though not the current account deficit) and credit
expansion (relevant only in Dooley’s model). The lack of consensus regarding
most variables arises from the fact that the methodology used is not
homogeneous, nor the definition of crises. If instead of assessing the empirical
validity of theoretical models by comparing them to the empirical studies, we
assess it by comparing them to the most well known crises of the last decades, the
results are less general but much more conclusive, as we study in section II.D.
                                                       
23 Kaminsky et al. (1998) gather many empirical studies in order to see which are
the most studied indicators of crises, and which of them have resulted to be more
significant in such studies. (1) 10 studies conclude that international reserves
(relative to GDP, or M2, etc.) are statistically significant, out of 11 studies that
tested such variable. (2) 3 out of 5 consider that public deficit is a significant
variable. (3) 3 out of 3 consider that credit to the public sector is significant. (4) 1
out of 1 consider that the money demand-supply gap is significant. (5) 10 out of 12
consider that the evolution of the real exchange rate is significant. (6) Just 2 out of
6 consider that current account balance is significant.
24 5 out of 7 studies reviewed in Kaminsky et al. (1998) consider that credit growth
is significant.41
B. Second Generation Models
The first second generation model dates from the mid 1980s (Obstfeld, 1986), but
most of them appeared after the European ERM crisis in 1992-93 and the Mexican
crisis in 1994-95, as experts observed that first generation models did not explain
those new crises. They consider that the variables those models usually take into
account are not the most outstanding ones in the new crises, and that the
mechanisms they describe are too rigid.
First, we study the main features of second generation models that are already
shown in Obstfeld’s 1986 model, and that are summarized in his prototype model
of 1996. In these two models, crises are a consequence of self-fulfilling
expectations, through a feedback process between the cost for the government of
maintaining a fixed exchange rate and the devaluation expectations of private
agents. Second, we summarize some models in which some concrete cases of
feedback and self-fulfillment are described.
It is difficult to know what is that awards homogeneity to this group of models,
given that there are many and very different models that the specialized literature
use to call with such name. It could be that the distinction between first and
second generation models relied on a chronological criterion: first generation
models would be those firstly elaborated, and second generation models would be
those that came afterwards, especially since the European crisis in 1992-93. But
we consider that there may be some other criteria of classification. We have
already said that we define as first generation models those models which
consider that crises are the unavoidable and predictable consequence of the
incompatibility between economic policies. Therefore, we consider that second
generation models are those that see crises as the consequence of self-fulfilling
expectations, so that crises are contingent and non-predictable phenomena.
B.1. General contributions of second generation models
We consider that there are two basic concepts in second generation models: self-
fulfillment and multiple equilibria. We explain them carefully and show two models
in which these concepts are presented. 
These models consider that the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime is not the
unavoidable result of an economic process, but a political choice: devaluation
depends on the solution to a government’s optimization problem in which the
benefits and costs of maintaining the fixed exchange rate are compared. First
generation models, as we have studied, consider that the government has no
alternative to defend the parity, apart from loosing international reserves. Second
generation models, instead, consider (explicitly or not) that there are more ways of
defending the fixed exchange rate (e.g. borrowing reserves from other countries,
rising interest rates, implementing some exchange controls...). But these policies42
may bring forth costs of maintaining the parity by worsening the state of
fundamentals (e.g. unemployment, current account deficit, increase of public
debt’s price...). The higher these costs are, in comparison to the costs of
abandoning the fixed parity, the lower is the confidence private agents have in the
government’s commitment to maintain its exchange rate policy, and the higher is
the probability of a devaluation.
In these models, the speculative attack, and the consequent devaluation, occur
when the market considers that the government is going to abandon the fixed
parity as a result of solving its optimization problem. That is, the attack occurs
when private agents perceive that the costs of maintaining the parity are too high
relative to the costs of abandoning it. An important insight of second generation
models is that the costs of maintaining the peg depend, in turn, on expectations.
“Speculative anticipations depend on conjectured government responses, which
depend, in turn, on how price changes, that are themselves fueled by
expectations, affect the government’s economic and political positions” (Obstfeld,
1994, p. 190). In other words: devaluation expectations bring forth changes in
fundamentals, which rise the costs of maintaining the fixed exchange rate. Such
rise of costs provoke an increase in devaluation expectations, so that a feedback
between expectations and costs of maintaining the fixed parity goes on until the
speculative attack occurs.
It is important to note that the origin of the process is not the mismanagement of
economic policy, but the expectations of private agents. So the government
decision of letting the currency float (or not) depends ultimately on private
expectations, which means that expectations are self-fulfilling. If private agents
expect that a devaluation will happen, it is more expensive to defend the parity,
and finally a devaluation comes about; and if, on the contrary, they expect that a
devaluation will not happen, the government is able to maintain the fixed exchange
rate. So that, according to these models there are crises that “need not have
occurred, but that they occur because market participants expect them to”
(Obstfeld, 1994, p. 190).
Depending on how private expectations are, there is one exchange rate or other,
both in equilibrium. Hence, there are several possible equilibria, and which one is
the resulting one depends on expectations. Obstfeld (1996), Cole and Kehoe
(1996 and 1998), and Chang and Velasco (1998), inter alia, note that the
existence of multiple equilibria depends on fundamentals. If fundamentals are very
good (e.g. there is no unemployment, nor public or trade deficit, nor liquidity
problems in the banking system...), there are hardly costs of defending a peg, so
that there is no feedback between costs and expectations. If, on the contrary,
fundamentals are very bad (as in Krugman, 1979) there is no possible equilibrium
without devaluation, so that such devaluation is unavoidable. Thus, multiple
equilibrium arises for a range of intermediate fundamentals.43
Obstfeld (1986) and his prototype model (Obstfeld, 1996) show the two main
concepts of second generation models (self-fulfillment and multiple equilibrium)
without using concrete fundamentals
25. Obstfeld (1986), starting from Flood and
Garber (1984), note that it is not reasonable to assume that private agents expect
fiscal and monetary policies to remain unchanged after the collapse of the
exchange rate regime (as first generation models implicitly assume); and prove
that removing such assumption from the model, multiple equilibrium arises (crisis
does not occur necessarily even when the shadow exchange rate exceeds the
fixed exchange rate) and expectations are self-fulfilling. The prototype model in
Obstfeld (1996) also shows that devaluation expectations can provoke a
successful speculative attack against the domestic currency, that is, that
expectations are self-fulfilling. Likewise, it explains that multiple equilibria depends
on whether fundamentals are placed in an intermediate range of values or not.
B.2. Some second generation models
The models we summarize in this section show concrete situations in which there
is multiple equilibria, and in which devaluation expectations are self-fulfilling. As
we did for first generation models, we should note that the models presented here
are just some examples of this kind of models.
Obstfeld (1994) presents two of these models. They show, respectively, the role of
the nominal interest rate and the growth of wages in the feedback process. Let us
study both cases separately. In the first model the main idea is that an increase in
the nominal interest rate, provoked by devaluation expectations, rises the price of
public debt, so that devaluation expectations increase even more. Under a flexible
exchange rate regime, the government, on the one hand, would use the currency
depreciation in order to compensate the effects on the price of public debt of the
nominal interest rate rise. Therefore, there is a function of the depreciation rate
respective to the interest rate. Private agents, on the other hand, rise their
depreciation expectations when the interest rate grows. Hence, there is another
function of the depreciation rate respective to the interest rate. The author
represents graphically both functions and observes that their intersection gives
place to more than one equilibrium. This is, there is not a unique pair (depreciation
rate, interest rate) that satisfies the government and the private agents, but two or
more. This indicates that there may be an equilibrium with a lower interest rate and
a lower depreciation, and another with a higher interest rate and a higher
depreciation. If, instead of a floating exchange rate regime, there is a fixed parity
the transition from one equilibrium to another is produced by a speculative attack
against the domestic currency.
                                                       
25 Other models, as we see below, use concrete fundamentals such as public
debt, unemployment, banking system liquidity... for explaining the existence of
multiple equilibria and the role of private expectations.44
Obstfeld (1996) states that there are other examples of self-fulfillment which
depend on the evolution of nominal interest rates. An increase in interest rates
may, apart from rising the cost of servicing public debt, put financial intermediaries
under pressure, or redistribute income in a way that the government find
undesirable. In any of these cases, the cost of maintaining the peg, and thus the
devaluation expectations, increase, so that an speculative attack is under way.
The second model in Obstfeld (1994) analyzes the influence of the growth of
wages on the devaluation rate. In this case, devaluation expectations lead to an
increase in the growth of wages and, consequently, to a loss of trade
competitiveness. Hence, output growth and employment may be eroded, so that
the cost of maintaining a peg, and thus devaluation expectations, rise. As in the
previous case, the author represents graphically the model with the aim of finding
the equilibrium between the private agents’ function and the government’s
function. As before, there is multiple equilibria, and which one is the resulting
equilibrium depends on private expectations.
The objective in Cole and Kehoe (1996 and 1998) is to assess “the values of
government debt and the debt’s maturity structure under which financial crises
brought on by a loss of confidence in the government can arise” (Cole and Kehoe,
1998, p. i). Such objective indicates that crises in these models arise as a
consequence of self-fulfilling expectations in a context of multiple equilibria, and
that there is a certain state of fundamentals (in this case: certain amount of public
debt and its maturity) that allows the existence of multiple equilibria. These authors
call “crisis zone” to such state of fundamentals that open the doors to self-
fulfillment.
The conclusions of the models are that: the crisis zone shrinks if the government is
able to reduce its debt or to lengthen its debt’s maturity, so that the government
will try to attain any of such things in order to exit the crisis zone and avoid being
at the mercy of self-fulfilling expectations. Besides, those prevention measures
(which consist in increasing the cost of devaluation) may be counterproductive if
they do not imply exiting the crisis zone, this is, if they do not eliminate the
possibility of a crisis, because they increase the severity of the crisis. The
conclusion that seems more relevant for our analysis is that the fundamentals that
allow self-fulfillment are, as in one of Obstfeld’s models, certain levels of public
debt and its maturity structure.
Calvo (1998a) considers that the main fundamental that allows for the appearance
of multiple equilibria and self-fulfillment is, instead, the banking system’s
vulnerability
26, which springs from a combination of certain policy measures meant
for compensating country risk with massive capital inflows. In the same article the
                                                       
26 Especially the mismatch between the maturities of assets and liabilities of
commercial banks.45
author shows that the current account deficit is not as relevant as financial
variables in permitting a self-fulfilling financial crisis. The reasoning he develops is
the following:
Firstly, he states that sovereignty leads to financial vulnerability (concretely to a
mismatch between the maturity of assets and liabilities of commercial banks). Why
is this so? There is uncertainty about the commitment of a government to maintain
its policies. Such uncertainty implies risk when investing in the country or when
lending money for investment projects in the country (such risk is called country
risk). Insurance markets are incapable of embracing the whole risk that uncertainty
brings about for investors. Therefore, governments try to compensate such risk
excess, not included in interest rates, by offering subsidies to investments and to
capital inflows or by imposing controls to the outflow of capital. Institutional
guarantees are an example of the risk compensation mechanisms this model
refers to. Such institutional guarantees usually provoke that commercial banks
lend capital for illiquid investments. This idea is well explained in Calvo (1996, p.
7): “if depositors believe that the central bank will operate as lender of last resort,
they will have little incentive to monitor the quality and characteristics of bank
loans. In particular, they will not be concerned by the existence of a mismatch of
maturity whereby loans exhibit longer maturity than deposits”.
Secondly, a massive inflow of capital also leads to financial vulnerability. Foreign
capital increases vulnerability of the banking system because on the one hand,
foreign capital is usually short-term
27; and on the other hand, foreign capital allows
the existence of more funds for lending to long-term investment projects. Besides,
private agents expect capital inflow to be temporary and the economy to return
sooner or later to its initial state. Hence, as private agents are conscious of the
system’s vulnerability to the reversal of funds, expectations of a banking crisis
increase. Such banking crisis would bring along a currency crisis because of
institutional guarantees offered by the central bank to commercial banks.
Moreover, herding
28 (Calvo and Mendoza, 1998) implies that investors do not
gather much information about the country’s fundamentals, but they tend to follow
market’s rumors, so that crises are more probable.
We consider that the most interesting insight in this model is that the fundamentals
it considers as relevant are financial fundamentals. Crises, following Calvo, may
arise without a current account or public deficit. The economic problems that allow
self-fulfilling expectations are financial (mainly the mismatch between the maturity
                                                       
27 In section III we will justify such statement by explaining that financial
globalization shortens the maturities of flows to emerging markets. Besides, there
is another model (Calvo, 1998b) which considers that even if capital inflows are
foreign direct investment they may lead to self-fulfilling crises. Shortness of
maturities just increase the probability of such crises.
28 Herding behavior is more thoroughly treated in section III.46
of commercial banks’ assets and liabilities), and they have their origin in
government sovereignty (because of the uncertainty it implies) and capital inflows.
Chang and Velasco (1998) present a model in which, as in the one we have just
summarized, financial system’s illiquidity
29 is the main problem. Likewise, they
show how the inflow of foreign capital (especially if it is short-term) and financial
market liberalization increase the banking system’s vulnerability to a change of
private agents’ expectations. Finally they show that if a fixed exchange rate exists
and if the central bank acts as a lender of last resort, a banking crisis leads to a
currency crisis.
As in the previous model, commercial banks act as maturity transformers, which
increases the population’s welfare, but which also opens the door to self-fulfilling
banking crises. As in the other models (Obstfeld, 1994; Cole and Kehoe, 1996 and
1998; Calvo, 1998a), not very good fundamentals (in this case, the financial
system’s illiquidity) are necessary for multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling crises to
occur, and it is not possible to predict which equilibrium is the one that is going to
result.
The receipt of foreign capital rises the banking system’s vulnerability through two
ways. Firstly, through the attitude of foreign lenders. They may decide, individually
and rationally, not to roll over their credit because they expect the other lenders
not to do so and, consequently, they expect a banking crisis to happen
(expectations of a banking crisis provokes a banking crisis). Secondly, through the
maturity of the external debt. The shorter the maturity of the debt the higher the
probability of a bank run, as it is easier for lenders not to roll over their loans. And
the bigger the amount of external debt, the higher the banking system’s
vulnerability, only if such big amount is mainly composed of short-term capital.
Also financial liberalization rises the banking system’s vulnerability. Chang and
Velasco (1998) take into consideration two specific liberalization policies: the
decrease of reserve requirements to commercial banks and the increase of
competition in the banking sector. Both measures rise welfare but makes a self-
fulfilling crisis more probable.
Finally, they show that, under a fixed exchange rate and with a central bank which
acts as a lender of last resort, the banking crisis turns into a currency crisis. This is
so because when deposits are retired, the central bank supplies emergency loans
to the commercial banks, which may deplete its international reserves. Hence, the
banking crisis is avoided, but the country suffers a currency crisis. If, on the
contrary, there was not a fixed exchange rate but a currency board, the central
                                                       
29 They define illiquidity as the “situation in which the financial system’s potential
short-term obligations exceed the liquidation value of its assets” (Chang and
Velasco, 1998, p.3).47
bank would not act as a lender of last resort. Thus, the banking crisis would bring
about the bankruptcy of many commercial banks, but the parity would survive.
B.3. Evaluation of second generation models
Let us see, as we did for first generation models, some theoretical advantages and
disadvantages of these models, as well as the empirical support they have.
An advantage of these models is that they present a general mechanism through
which crises may be originated. Hence, their explanatory capacity, if we take them
as a whole, do not rely on very concrete variables, but in a general mechanism
which may be refilled with many concrete fundamentals, and thus may be applied
to a wide range of crises. This is, second generation models offer an explanation
that do not depend on the variables included in concrete models (although, of
course, concrete models include concrete variables: interest rates or public debt or
financial fragility). Instead, first generation models offer an explanation which is too
rigid and too mechanical, and which relies on too concrete variables.
Nevertheless, the width of second generation models may be an inconvenient, as
they loose the precision that first generation models have: they explain a
theoretical idea (that crises are self-fulfilling) without determining precisely what
must go on in the domestic and/or international economy for crises to occur.
Second generation models explain that there are multiple possible equilibria, given
certain fundamentals. But they do not go deeper into which factors provoke the
change in expectations that lead to a crisis: “in these models (...) the treatment of
speculators is far less meticulous than the treatment of policymakers” (Drazen,
1998, p. 3). In order to widen the explanatory capacity of second generation
models it would be necessary to turn expectations into an endogenous variable of
models. While expectations are not endogenous it is not possible to know a priori
which equilibrium is going to turn out. Hence, these models are not predictive,
which is an obvious disadvantage. “How useful is a model with multiple equilibria –
a model that can explain different outcomes for the same fundamentals in the
environment?” (Cole and Kehoe, 1996, p. 329).
We consider that second generation models are “better” than first generation
models because they may be used for explaining a wider range of crisis, but that
they are “worse” because they do not even try to be predictive. Second generation
models win width and lose precision.
While first generation models put the blame on governments, second generation
models put it on private agents behavior. Therefore, it could be said that another
disadvantage of second generation models is that they free governments from the
responsibility of avoiding currency crises, that they forgive policymakers for the
financial crises that occur. However, policymakers still have a responsibility: to
avoid multiple equilibria, to exit the crisis zone.48
Finally, remember that second generation models consider that crises depend on
the governments’ choice, and that such choice, in turn, depends on the costs of
maintaining the fixed parity relative to those of abandoning it. Flood and Marion
(1996) consider that it is not always true that increasing the costs of a default
reduce its probability. They study the model presented by Obstfeld in 1994 about
wages growth, and conclude that “raising the cost of devaluation may make a
crisis more likely” (Flood and Marion, 1996, p. 1).
Let us now see if the empirical literature about financial crises support what
second generation models hold. While according to first generation models the
evolution of international reserves is crucial for predicting crises, second
generation models stress the importance of many other variables for the
government’s decision to abandon or not the fixed parity. They coincide in the
existence of an optimizing government, multiple equilibria and self-fulfillment, but
they differ in which are those other variables that may serve as indicators of the
proximity of a crisis.
For instance, the first model in Obstfeld (1994) considers that interest rates rise
before crises as a consequence of devaluation expectations, and that such rise in
interest rates bring about an increase in the cost of servicing public debt, and
finally the decision of abandoning the peg. Obstfeld also considers that the
increase in interest rates may end up provoking a crises through other channels
different from public debt, as through pressures on financial intermediaries, or
through an undesirable redistribution of income. There is not much empirical
support for interest rates rising before crises. In Kaminsky et al. (1998) it is shown
that there are not many studies which asses the behavior of such variable. The
same occurs with public debt. Therefore, there is not much empirical support for
this model
30.
Obstfeld’s second model (1994) has more empirical support. It argues that the
expectation of a devaluation brings about higher wages, which may lead to a
decrease in competitiveness, and thus in output growth and employment. The
authorities’ concerns about competitiveness, output and employment finally
provoke the abandonment of the peg. Frankel and Rose (1996) and Esquivel and
Larraín (1998) consider that output growth diminishes before currency crises.
Likewise, Kaminsky et al. (1998) show that much of the empirical literature about
crises display that same result. Regarding unemployment, there are also some
empirical studies which consider that it may serve as an indicator of financial
crises. The behavior of wages is not usually analyzed in these kind of empirical
                                                       
30 Nevertheless, if, instead of taking into account for this assessment the general
empirical studies, we took into consideration more specific ones (those focused in
a concrete financial crisis) we may conclude that this model in Obstfeld (1994)
explains quite well what happened in Mexico in 1994. See section II.D.49
literature. And about competitiveness we should repeat what we said above: the
evolution of real exchange rates as indicator of currency crises has much empirical
support. On the contrary, the evolution of the current account balance has not
such support
31.
Cole and Kehoe (1996 and 1998) present a model in which the fundamentals that
open the door to self-fulfilling crises are public debt and its maturity structure. We
have just noted that there are not enough studies about the behavior of public debt
before crises as to be conclusive. The same happens with the maturity structure of
public debt.
Calvo’s model we have analyzed (Calvo, 1998a) consider that crises may result
from a fragile banking system, which transform short-term foreign capital inflows
into long-term domestic loans, leaning on subsidies or guarantees. The problem
showed in Chang and Velasco (1998) is very similar to that in Calvo (1998a):
short-term capital inflows end up causing illiquidity problems in the banking
system. There are not many studies in which short-term capital inflows are
analyzed. Instead, credit growth is highly supported by empirical evidence, as we
saw for Dooley (1997)
32. Thus, once more, results are not very conclusive
33.
Hitherto, we have assessed if, according to several empirical studies, the variables
included in second generation models may serve as indicators of the proximity of a
crisis. The empirical relevance of multiple equilibria and self-fulfillment is much
more difficult to assess. It would be necessary to find indicators which showed
private expectations of devaluation, and the causal link between shifts in such
expectations and a rise in the cost of maintaining the peg and the political decision
of abandoning it.
There are no indicators of suck kind in the empirical literature about financial
crises. Anyway, there are some attempts of showing the existence of self-
fulfillment: Eichengreen et al. (1995) consider that their findings are evidence of
the existence of self-fulfillment. Those findings are that many crises were not
linked to the mechanism shown in first generation models; that some crises were
nor preceded or followed by changes in economic policies, so that it could not be
said that crises were produced by private agents correctly anticipating an
                                                       
31 Anyway, we should note that more specific studies conclude that this model is
useful for explaining the European crisis in 1992-93. See section II.D.
32 1 out of 1 studies in Kaminsky et al. (1998) find that real interest rates are
significant. 1 out of 1 consider that public debt is significant. 5 out of 8 consider
that real GDP growth or level is significant. 2 out of 3 consider that
employment/unemployment is significant. 1 out of 2 consider that short-term
capital inflows are significant. 5 out of 7 consider that credit growth is significant.
33 Nevertheless, these two models, according to more specific studies, help to
understand what happened in East Asia in 1997. See section II.D.50
unavoidable collapse; and that crises happened without anticipation of the market.
These arguments obviously provide evidence against first generation models, but
prove neither the shift in private expectations nor its link to financial crises. Thus,
they do not prove the existence of self-fulfillment
34.
As we noted regarding to first generation models, empirical studies offer results
which are not very conclusive. The variables most tested and most significant
related to second generation models are output, some measure of
competitiveness (different from the current account evolution), and credit
expansion.
FIRST GENERATION MODELS SECOND GENERATION MODELS
Crises are unavoidable Crises are contingent
Crises are predictable Crises are unpredictable
Private expectations advance the
crises
Private expectations are self-fulfilling
(so that they cause the crises)
Bad fundamentals cause the crises Bad fundamentals permit self-
fulfillment
The government’s policies lead to bad
fundamentals
The government chooses between
policies given certain fundamentals
C. Contagion Models
It is empirically observed (Glick and Rose, 1998; Sachs et al., 1996; Kruger et al.,
1998) that when a financial crisis happens, it is common that other crisis occur in a
short period of time, and usually in the same geographic area. That was the case
in the European crisis in 1992-93, in the Mexico crisis in 1994, and in the East
Asian crisis in 1997 (Glick and Rose, 1998).
There are several theoretical studies about such fact
35. It is important to note,
before summarizing some contagion models, that not always that crises coincide
in time, there has been contagion. How can this be? Following Drazen, we
consider there is contagion when “a currency crisis itself in one country makes a
currency crisis (or currency weakness in another country) more likely” (Drazen,
1998, p. 5). Being so, when there are crises that coincide in time (and maybe also
in region) but which origins are an external common factor, instead of being one
crisis the origin of the other, there has been no contagion. Crises
contemporaneous in time “may be due to a common cause, for instance policies
undertaken by industrial countries which have similar effects on emerging
markets”. Those crises are provoked by “monsoonal effects, defined as major
                                                       
34 Anyway, some specific studies prove the existence of self-fulfillment in some
concrete crises. See section II.D.
35 See Gerlach and Smets (1994); Masson (1998); and Drazen (1998).51
economic shifts in industrial countries that trigger crises in emerging markets”
(Masson, 1998, p. 4-5). He refers specifically to changes in international interest
rates and/or exchange rates of industrial economies’ currencies, which may
provoke an outflow of funds from many emerging markets maybe in the same
year, and maybe in the same geographical area, giving the image that there had
been a contagion between countries. Obviously, crises brought about by
monsoonal effects may be included in the first or in the second generation group,
depending on the same criteria we used before. If the external shock provokes a
change in fundamentals which, in turn, leads to the crisis, a first generation model
could be developed in order to explain such monsoonal effect. On the contrary, if
the external shock provokes a change in expectations which turn to be self-
fulfilling, a second generation model would be more explicative.
Why do we separate the analysis of contagion from the other models? Can not we
include contagion in any of the two generations of models? The fact seems to be
that there are some contagion models that would more or less fit in first generation
models, as the crises they study are unavoidable crises caused by the worsening
of fundamentals, and others that would fit in second generation models, as the
crises they study are contingent crises caused by self-fulfilling expectations.
C.1. Different kinds of contagion
Let us return to Drazen’s definition. It said, in other words, that there is contagion
when the first cause of a currency crisis, or speculative pressures on a currency, is
the currency crisis of another country. We must note, nevertheless, that the crisis
in the country firstly affected is not the only cause of the second country’s crisis.
Between such first crisis and the second one, a worsening of fundamentals and/or
changes in private expectations must occur for the crisis in the second country to
happen. This is, the first crisis by itself can not trigger a crisis in another country. It
triggers, instead, certain mechanisms that directly cause such second crisis.
Depending on whether the first crisis leads to a worsening of fundamentals in the
second country, or to a change in expectations, Masson (1998) distinguishes
between spillovers and pure contagion.
About spillovers Masson says that “a crisis in one emerging market may affect the
macroeconomic fundamentals in other emerging market” (Masson, 1998, p. 4),
and thus provoke a crisis in such other markets. A crisis in one country may affect
the fundamentals of a second country through two different ways. Firstly, through
trade linkages between both countries: the devaluation in one country leads to a
loss of competitiveness in its trading partners, and consequently to trade deficit
and declining reserves in such countries. Gerlach and Smets (1994) formalize this
possibility. Starting from Flood and Garber (1984), they assume that there are two
countries and that both of them have excessive domestic credit creation (as the
country in Flood and Garber, 1984, and other first generation models). The
collapse of one of the exchange rate regimes accelerates the collapse of the52
second exchange rate (it accelerates an unavoidable collapse, as those in first
generation models). Nevertheless, they also conclude that even when the second
country’s parity is sustainable (this is, a crisis need not occur), contagion may
happen.
Following Gerlach and Smets (1994) the mechanism that leads to a crisis in the
second country is the following: the devaluation of the first currency brings about,
on the one hand, a reduction in the price of the first country’s goods in the second
country. Hence the second country’s price level falls. On the other hand, since it is
assumed that wages are not flexible, the second country looses competitiveness.
Both effects provoke deflationary pressures on wages and output that reduce the
money demand. Hence, domestic credit growth generates a higher excess of
money supply, that private agents exchange for foreign currency, reducing thus
the international reserves. The higher the trade integration between both
countries, the lower the wage flexibility, and the lower the trade integration
between both countries and the country to which currency their currencies are
pegged, the stronger are the contagion effects.
The second way through which fundamentals may be worsened as a
consequence of a crisis in another country, is via financial markets: a third country
liquidate its positions in one country in order to cover the losses that the crisis in
the first country has brought about.
Can we consider these crises as first generation crises or as second generation
crises? The answer to this question is not clear. Anyway, we believe that the
worsening of fundamentals, may, on the one hand, lead by itself to an unavoidable
crisis, in which case, a first generation model could be useful to explain contagion
(as in Gerlach and Smets, 1994). Such worsening of fundamentals may, on the
other hand, simply put the country into what Cole and Kehoe (1996 and 1998) call
the crisis zone. This is, the worsening of fundamentals may just open the door to
self-fulfilling expectations, which would be the direct cause of the crisis in the
second country.
“A crisis in one country may conceivably trigger a crisis elsewhere for reasons
unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals, perhaps because it leads to shifts
in market sentiment or changes the interpretation given to existing information”
(Masson, 1998, p. 4). In such case there is pure contagion. The currency crisis
that occurs in one country does not provoke any change in the other countries’
fundamentals, but it changes the assessment of such fundamentals or the risk
tolerance of investors. Hence, private expectations change, leading to a self-
fulfilling crisis. Masson (1998) formalizes this possibility in a balance of payments
model, which shows that for a certain range of fundamentals there is multiple
equilibria. Such range is determined by external debt, reserves and the trade
balance. Vulnerability to contagion is greater “when there is a large (floating rate)
debt, when reserves are low, and when the trade balance is in deficit” (Masson,53
1998, p. 13).
Pure contagion may be inscribed, thus, in the second generation models literature,
as it considers that there is multiple equilibria and that crises are contingent and
consequence of self-fulfilling expectations. Likewise, for multiple equilibria to exist,
and hence for pure contagion to happen, fundamentals must be inscribed in a
medium quality range.
Such sort of contagion is compatible with many microeconomic theories about
private behavior in financial markets. Jumps between equilibria, and thus pure
contagion, are possible because of e.g. the existence of herding (Calvo and
Mendoza, 1998) and information cascades (Bikhchandani, et al., 1992). Some of
these mechanisms, related to asymmetric information, are analyzed in section III.
Drazen (1998) identifies another kind of contagion, which he names political
contagion. In his model a crisis depends on a political decision which depends, in
turn, on political factors. Other models (in particular, most second generation
models) also consider that crises depend on the government decision. But, as we
studied above, such decision depends on the costs of maintaining a peg, which in
most second generation models are economic costs (e.g., in Obstfeld, 1994, the
cost that a rising interest rate implies for facing the service of public debt). In
Drazen (1998) such costs are not economic, but political: abandoning the fixed
exchange rate implies giving up the benefits of belonging to a “club” (e.g. a
political-economic integration project) in which the condition of membership is
precisely the fixed exchange rate. Therefore, political contagion occurs as follows:
when a member of the club suffers a currency crisis and is forced to abandon the
fixed parity, the value of membership decreases, especially if such country was
particularly important for the existence of the club. Thus, expectations that private
agents assign to a devaluation in the rest of the members, rise, increasing the
probability of contagion. Political contagion may be considered a spillover if
political parameters (more precisely, the political value of belonging to a “club”) are
considered as fundamentals. Otherwise political contagion is clearly a concrete
case of pure contagion.
C.2. Evaluation of contagion models
We have seen that second generation models do not explain the causes of jumps
from one equilibrium to another: “it is usual to consider jumps between equilibria
as being stochastic” (Masson, 1998, p. 13). Why do expectations change? What
causes those jumps between equilibria? An advantage of some contagion models
is that they give an answer to these questions. The answer, according to pure
contagion theory, is that it is a crisis in another country which provokes a shift in
expectations, and finally a financial crisis in the country in question.54
There is some empirical support for the existence of contagion. Regarding
spillovers, Glick and Rose (1998) provide an empirical study in which trade links
between countries explain the spread of a crisis along regional lines better than
macroeconomic factors do. And regarding pure contagion, Esquivel and Larraín
(1998), Eichengreen et al. (1996), and Kruger et al. (1998) present studies in
which regional contagion not related to fundamentals is a significant variable.
Sachs et al. provides a model in which contagion occurs in countries with bad
fundamentals (low international reserves, real exchange rate appreciation and
banking fragility measured by lending booms), and argue that the “tequila
hangover” fits in such model.
D. Explanatory and Predictive Capacity of Theoretical Models: the East
Asian Crises
In this section we have the aim of assessing the utility of theoretical models for
explaining and predicting financial crises, according to the most important crises of
the last decades (those reviewed in section I), and especially to the East Asian
episode. In order to do so, we will study if the models studied are consistent with
the empirical analysis done in section I.
D.1. First generation models
Despite the fact that first generation models are not completely supported by
empirical evidence, it would be unfair to discard their explanatory capacity for
some financial crises. In other words, it may be that some variables which are not
significant in empirical studies (for instance, current account deficits), or which are
not even thoroughly tested (e.g. the money demand-supply gap), are useful for
explaining some particular crises.
Thus, first generation models explain quite well Latin America’s crises during the
1980s. Latin American countries were engaged in expansionary monetary policies
in order to finance their public deficits. Moreover, they suffered from a real
appreciation of their domestic currencies and also from a current account
deterioration, due to such appreciation and to the surge in consumption. Hitherto,
first generation models are consistent with what happened in Latin America. But
the models do not explain that the surge in consumption was prompted by
excessive commercial bank lending, which, in its turn, was provoked by foreign
capital inflows (in this case in the shape of syndicated bank loans to the public
sector), financial liberalization, lack of banking supervision and official deposit
guarantees. Therefore, these models are missing the role of financial variables
(such as financial liberalization, capital inflows, or banking intermediation) when
explaining the Latin American crises.
First generation models are not useful for understanding the East Asian crises.
And of course they could not have been useful for predicting them. The East Asian55
countries, as we explained in section I, did not suffer from public deficits, so they
did not need to issue money in order to finance such deficits. Hence, there was not
a money demand-supply gap which could end up at the depletion of reserves. The
only fact in which the models and the East Asian crises coincide is in the real
appreciation of the currency previous to the collapse of the exchange rate regime.
Dooley’s (1997) model, though, explains more of the East Asian crises than the
mainstream first generation models, as it substitutes conventional fundamentals
for financial fundamentals, such as financial liberalization, weak regulation of the
banking system, massive capital inflows and credit expansion. We saw above that
all these variables played a role in the generation of the East Asian crises.
It seems obvious that with the knowledge provided by first generation models,
leaving aside Dooley (1997), it could not have been possible to predict the East
Asian crises, as these crises were produced by mechanisms different from the
monetization of public deficits. Anyway, in order to assess weather new first
generation models, such as Dooley (1997) are consistent with reality, we should
study if the East Asian crises were predictable (though with different indicators that
those provided by first generation models) and unavoidable (though for different
reasons that those provided by first generation models). Were East Asian crises
predictable and unavoidable? Firstly, East Asian crises were not predicted.
Nevertheless, this does not mean necessarily that they could not have been
predicted. About the predictability of crises see below, where we conclude that the
East Asian crises were contingent, and thus not predictable, but that there are
some important arguments against such conclusion
36. Secondly, East Asian crises
were not unavoidable: a soft landing could have been possible in the absence of
financial panic, as discussed in section I of this paper.
D.2. Second generation models
As we have studied above, there are many different second generation models,
though with a common spirit. Let us see if the crises  described in section I, and
especially the East Asian crises, can be explained with any of them, or at least fit
in the general model, in the general spirit of these models.
We have seen that Obstfeld (1994) provides two models. In the first one the main
fundamental which opens the door to self-fulfillment is the rise of public debt’s
price (through a rise of interest rates). The models by Cole and Kehoe (1996 and
1998) also consider that it is public debt, and especially its maturity structure,
which leads speculators to expect a devaluation, and thus to attack the currency of
the country in question.
There are many authors who consider that a public debt model, such as these two
models, explains much of what happened in Mexico in 1994-95. Mexico had short-
                                                       
36 See Kaminsky (1998).56
term private and public debt. The most relevant fundamental in Mexico was not the
amount of debt it had (that was not so big relative to international standards), but
the maturity structure of its debt. Following Cole and Kehoe (1996) Mexico’s public
debt (its amount and especially its maturity) put the country in a crisis zone.
Mexico finally suffered self-fulfilling speculative attacks: “the fear of a government
default led to the inability of the government to issue new debt, which in turn
seemed about to confirm the fears of a default” (Cole and Kehoe, 1998, p. 2).
Nevertheless, there are some elements of the Mexican crisis which these models
have not explained, mainly financial factors, such as the role of financial
liberalization, weak banking regulation, capital inflows and credit expansion.
Self-fulfilling expectations, in the case of East Asia, can not have surged from the
expectation that the government would devalue in order to lower the public debt’s
price, because East Asian countries did not have a high amount of public debt.
Instead, their debt was mainly private. Nevertheless, the East Asian case coincide
with what was described in Cole and Kehoe (1996 and 1998) because foreign debt
was a short-term one. External debt was not public but it was in short-term
liabilities. “We think that a version of our model that incorporates a private banking
system with explicit or implicit government-provided insurance to the foreign
lenders could account for these [East Asian] crises” (Cole and Kehoe, 1998, p.
32).
Obstfeld’s second model consider that it is the loss of output and employment
(through the loss of competitiveness, provoked, in its turn, by a rise of wages)
which permits self-fulfilling expectations.
Following the empirical study in section I, it seems that such model explains much
of what happened in Europe in 1992-93. Some countries in Europe suffered a
recession (slow growth and unemployment) which was in part the result of
maintaining a fixed exchange rate: the appreciation of the German Mark led to the
appreciation of these countries’ currencies, which brought about a loss in
competitiveness and the deterioration of the current account. Finally, there were
massive speculative attacks that provoked devaluations in the affected countries.
As argued in section I, such attacks were excessive respective to the real lack of
soundness in European fundamentals. The crises may have been avoided with a
realignment of the currencies. This description matches quite well with Obstfeld’s
model. Nevertheless, as for the crises in Latin America in 1982 and in Mexico in
1994, some parts of the empirical explanation are missing in the theoretical model.
Again the model does not include some relevant financial variables.
The East Asian countries did not have low output growth rates nor unemployment
problems, so that the self-fulfilling expectations could not have arisen from such
problems. Only a slightly macroeconomic worsening became apparent in 1996,
related to a large extent to a loss in competitiveness. The loss of competitiveness
was not brought about by a rise in wages, as in Obstfeld’s model, but by the57
appreciation of the currency and some other factors discussed in section I.  Thus,
although the model is not totally consistent with the East Asian crises, they
coincide in that a deterioration of the current account may open the door to the
speculative attacks that lead to the crisis.
We saw above that Calvo (1998a) and Chang and Velasco (1998) consider that
financial vulnerability is the main problem that leads to a self-fulfilling crisis. Such
models fit better with what we studied in section I about the East Asian crises.
These models and the empirical evidence coincide in that: before the crisis there is
a massive capital inflow; rapid financial liberalization has a role in the generation of
crises as it permits such capital inflow and the mismanagement of funds; capital
inflows are mainly short-term; banks act as maturity transformers by borrowing on
a short-term basis and lending on a long-term basis; illiquidity increases
vulnerability to crises, which finally occur because of a financial panic.
Nevertheless, on the one hand, these models consider that banking crises occur
before currency crises, a sequence which did not fit with what happened in East
Asia, where the currency crises happened previously. On the other hand, they lack
many of the relevant variables of the East Asian crises. Maybe an extension of
these models (including for instance, among other things, current account
deterioration) would be more explicative of the East Asian crises.
 
In short, each second generation model includes some explanation of how certain
bad fundamentals in East Asia may have opened the door to self-fulfilling crises.
But none of them is able to give a complete view of reality. More precisely, even
the last two models that we have seen, which seem to get closer to what
happened in East Asia, are sticking exclusively to financial domestic variables,
thus leaving out the trade-related aspects of the East Asian crises (already shown
in section I), and the explanation of how the international financial system allows
for massive capital flows to emerging markets and for self-fulfilling speculative
attacks (which is analyzed in section III).
Hitherto, we have just assessed the coincidence between the variables included
as bad fundamentals in some second generation models and some of the
variables found to be relevant in the empirical study of section I. But what about
the general features of second generation models? What about their spirit? There
are some studies (Jeanne, 1997; Cole and Kehoe, 1996) which estimate
theoretical models in concrete cases (the French franc crisis in 1992-93, and the
Mexican crisis in 1994-95, respectively), and conclude that there is evidence of
multiple equilibria and self-fulfillment in such cases. What about the East Asian
crises? Was there a self-fulfillment of expectations? As argued in section I, a soft
landing would have been possible in the absence of speculative attacks. In other
words, the East Asian crises were contingent, as there were no fundamentals
which, by themselves, could have led irremediably to the crises. It was financial
panic (caused by the entry of the East Asian economies in a “crisis zone”) which
finally provoked the crises, as second generation models describe. Nevertheless a58
further analysis of the shift in expectations and the causal link between such shift
and the crises is necessary. Being the East Asian crises contingent, they could not
have been predicted. Nevertheless, the predictability of crises is discussed below.
D.3. Contagion
Leaving aside first and second generation models, we may assess if there was
contagion between countries. It is obvious that many crises have coincide in a
short period of time, even beyond the East Asian borders. Theoretically it could be
that there was no contagion (through spillovers or pure contagion) between
countries, but just monsoonal effects. Though, the only external shock that could
have affected all the economies at a time was the appreciation of the dollar
respective to the yen, given that the East Asian countries had pegs with the dollar,
and given the large extent of their trade with the U.S. and Japan. Apart from such
fact, the international economic and financial environment was favorable for the
East Asian countries (see section I). Besides, the appreciation of the dollar began
to occur at least two years before the crises, while trade patterns were quite
different across the East Asian countries (Masson, 1998). Thus, although it is
necessary to study this matter more thoroughly, we conclude that monsoonal
effects were not the main explanation for crises happening in many countries in
the same period of time.
Therefore there must have been spillovers or pure contagion. Theoretically,
spillovers via trade and via financial markets may have happened between East
Asian countries. It is not easy to assess empirically if it has been so. It seems that
trade spillovers can not have been very significant for the following reasons:
currency crises occurred in a very short period of time, so that there was virtually
no time between one crisis and another for an important change in fundamentals
to happen (Masson, 1998, p. 19, considers that competitiveness spillovers were
small until November 1997); a big part of the decrease in competitiveness of
Malaysia and South Korea is explained by the features of the international market
of semiconductors, and not by the devaluation in Thailand; Indonesia did not even
show a remarkable worsening of its current account or exports before its crisis.
“The trade magnitudes are probably still too small to explain contagion beginning
in Thailand, even when both bilateral trade and third-market trade are included”
(Drazen, 1998, p. 8).
What about pure contagion? We said, following Masson (1998), that pure
contagion occurs when a crisis in a second country results from a change in the
investors’ perception of fundamentals, or from a change in their risk tolerance.
This explanation of contagion seems more plausible for the East Asian case, as
fundamentals in many of those countries had been the same for years, and it was
not until the Thai crisis erupted that investors realized that other East Asian
countries also had financial and current account problems. Nevertheless, such
explanation of contagion has the disadvantage that it is residual. This is, if the59
coincidence of crises can not be explained by fundamentals nor by monsoonal
effects, it is said that there has been pure contagion. But it would be necessary to
demonstrate the shift in the investors’ perception of fundamentals and the causal
relationship between such shift and the crises.
D.4. Utility of theoretical models
According to what we have studied, how useful are financial crises models? Are
they useful for explaining and/or predicting financial crises? Regarding the
explanatory capacity of models, we have seen that models always miss some part
of reality. This does not mean necessarily that theoretical models (or financial
crises models in particular) are useless for explaining reality. Simplicity (and hence
the omission of some variables) is an inherent feature of theoretical models,
thanks to which they are understandable and thus useful. Models are more simple
than the processes or aspects from the real world which they represent.
Otherwise, models would be as complex as reality and equally not understandable
(Gordon, 1991).
Regarding financial crises models, we have seen that, though all the models lack
some elements of reality, they are useful for explaining it. Theory always shows, at
least, a starting point from which it is easier to broach the study of a complex
empirical process, as financial crises always are. All the models studied here, by
pointing out some variables and mechanisms, contribute to identify which may
have been the problems that in such or such case led to a crisis. Thus, first
generation models provide useful insights about how to explain the Latin American
crises of 1982. Second generation models focused on short-term public debt are
useful to understand the Mexican crisis of 1994; those focused on growth and
unemployment related to competitiveness are useful for explaining the European
crises of 1992-93. And models focused on financial vulnerabilities help to
understand the East Asian crises of 1997-98.
Anyway, albeit simple, theoretical models should not omit transcendental issues.
The European and the Mexican crises revealed that crises could emerge from a
shift in expectations, and that, therefore, first generation models do not serve as a
general model for explaining crises
37. Hence, second generation models arose in
order to widen the explanatory capacity of financial crises models, by including
self-fulfilling expectations. But we consider that models of financial crises are still
missing something transcendental.
First, generation models and even second generation models do not explain how
can it be that a small shift in fundamentals or a crisis in a neighboring country may
bring about a shift in expectations capable of provoking crises as severe as the
                                                       
37 Though first generation models may not serve as a general explanation of
financial crises, crises as explained by those models may still occur.60
East Asian crises. The answer to such question is found in the international
financial system. “The financial system may act as a multiplier mechanism,
implying a much greater social cost than that consistent with the change in
fundamentals” (Chang and Velasco, 1998, p. 31). Financial crises models,
hitherto, explain the role of fundamentals, this is, they offer a domestic view of the
existence of crises (in first generation models “bad” fundamentals cause a crisis; in
second generation models “bad” fundamentals make the crisis possible). They do
not explain, instead, the role of the international context that allows the step from
fundamentals to crises.
This is not the place for entering in such area of study. Anyway, let us give an
example of how the international financial market acts as the complementary
element of fundamentals when explaining a crisis. Asymmetric information, which
is an inherent feature of the current international financial system, brings about
herding behavior, which makes investors follow rumors more than thoroughly
gathered information about fundamentals, thus permitting the step from a small
shift of fundamentals (or even just a shift in the perception of fundamentals an
important investor has) to a massive speculative attack and a crisis. In section III
we study more carefully the mechanisms through which the prevailing financial
system (and more precisely, financial globalization) increases the probability of
crises to erupt.
Summing up, we conclude that theoretical models provide many elements which
help to understand financial crises. Thus, they are useful for explaining (albeit
partially) why and how do financial crises surge. Nevertheless, their explanatory
capacity would be widened if models took into account the role of the international
financial system in originating a financial crisis.
Let us study now the predictive capacity of financial crises models. We have seen,
on the one hand, that first generation models have not proved to be very useful for
predicting financial crises. Despite the fact that they intend to be predictive, they
have not served for predicting any of the financial crises of the 1990s, which
emerged for reasons different to those explained in first generation models. On the
other hand, second generation models do not even intend to be predictive, as they
see crises as the result of a shift in expectations and they do not explain what is it
that produces such shift. Hence, financial crises models are not predictive.
We have seen that there are multiple studies which try to build indicators useful for
predicting crises (for instance, Kaminsky et al., 1998). Such indicators are based
on empirical evidence. That is, the experts take into consideration the regularities
observed empirically in order to build the predictive indicator. Each new crisis
teaches something about what fundamentals (and/or what international financial
system) may lead to a crisis. Such lessons should be embodied in the indicators of61
crises
38. What role do theoretical models play in the construction of predictive
indicators? On the one hand, by showing how crises may occur, they indicate a
starting point for the search of empirical regularities (e.g. if theoretically it is shown
that public deficits may lead to a crisis, it is necessary to test its significance). On
the other hand, theoretical models provide the explanation of why some empirical
regularities are found. This is, the models are the economic general rule which
explains the observed link between such variable and a crisis
39.
Therefore, it seems that neither empirical studies nor theoretical models are
completely useless for predicting crises, as they offer, respectively, the knowledge
of what goes on or may be going on before a financial crisis erupts. Nevertheless,
we consider that these indicators of crises can only warn of the possibility of a
financial crisis, but not predict them. At least not yet. As we have seen (and we will
see in section III), financial crises depend on many kinds of variables (from purely
economic, as monetization, to psychological, as herding behavior), and there are
no indicators which consider them all
40. It is necessary for theory to evolve in order
to provide new insights useful for the construction of more predictive indicators.
Maybe even then, it will not be possible to predict all crises, as financial crises are
historical phenomena (in the same sense that wars or revolutions are historical
phenomena, this is, complex and unique). Being financial crises historical
phenomena, they are determined by economic, political, psychological factors
(which may be taken into consideration in models or predictive indicators), but also
by factors which a researcher would never take into account and that therefore are
considered hazardous
41.
                                                       
38 Nevertheless, given that each crisis might be different to the previous ones, the
resulting indicators would never be useful for predicting every new crisis, but just
those similar to a preceding one.
39 About the necessity of general rules for explaining empirically observed
relationships between variables see Gordon (1991).
40 Some efforts have been made in this path. See Kaminsky and Schmukler
(1999).
41 For an analysis of causation in history see Carr (1961).62
III. Financial Globalization and Financial Crises in Emerging
Economies: The Case of East Asia
A. Financial Globalization and Emerging Economies: Features and Causes
As already mentioned, the purpose of section III is to highlight the financial
vulnerabilities an emerging economy can incur in because of its integration in
international financial markets. For this reason, we have limited our study of the
economic globalization process to a descriptive overview of financial globalization
and its implications for emerging countries. We will first analyze the current
process of economic globalization from a comparative perspective, that is, relative
to the first wave of globalization which took place between the end of the last
century and 1914. Secondly, we will study the main characteristics of the
integration of emerging markets in world financial markets and the factors behind
this phenomenon.
A.1. The two waves of economic globalization from a comparative perspective
Economic globalization is not a new phenomenon. There was a former
globalization process that began at the end of the last century and that was
suddenly stopped by the First World War. According to Baldwin and Martin (1999),
there are superficial similarities but fundamental differences between those two
waves of globalization. Both processes have the same magnitude, that is, they are
similar with regards to volumes of trade or financial flows. However, there are
some important qualitative differences between both waves that we will now
review.
In relation to trade integration, both waves are similar. Before the First World War,
there was an accelerated increase in international trade. Imports grew at 3.5% per
year in the second half of the 19th Century and until 1914, while GDP growth
reached a 2.7% annual rate during the same period (IMF, 1997). The proportion of
exports relative to the world GDP reached a maximum in 1913 that was not
attained again until 1970. As to the second wave of globalization, the degree of
trade integration (measured by the ratio of trade to production) has doubled in the
last 50 years (IMF, 1997). Both waves of globalization were mainly promoted by a
process of trade liberalization, through a reduction in tariffs. In what concerns the
first era, the corn law was abolished in 1846 and the Cobden-Chevalier treaty was
signed by France and the United Kingdom in 1860. Regarding the second era, the
GATT (now WTO) was created after the Second World War in order to steadily
eliminate international trade barriers. However, there are two important differences
between both processes. In the first place, the product composition of trade has
changed: there is a higher share of industrial products and a lower proportion of
raw materials traded in the current wave. This fact is mainly a consequence of the
increase in intra-industrial and intra-firm trade. Secondly, the share of developing63
countries in manufactured exports has increased in the second wave of
globalization (relative to the first wave). According to Bhaduri (1998), until 1970
developing countries accounted for less than 5% of total manufactured exports,
while in 1993 this figure increased to 22%. Nevertheless, we must note that these
manufactured exports from developing countries were concentrated in a small
number of countries, while the least developed countries kept on exporting raw
materials.
There has been an accelerated process of financial internationalization in the last
three decades. For instance, the total stock of all financial assets traded in global
markets rose from US$ 5,000 billion in 1980 to US$ 35,000 billion in 1992
(Eatwell, 1996). However, according to Baldwin and Martin (1999), both financial
globalization waves have been quantitatively similar and, for some countries, the
levels recorded before the First World War have not been reached yet, at least
with regards to capital flows (table 3.1.
42). Nevertheless, there are two elements
that distinguish both eras of financial globalization. Firstly, the composition of flows
has changed: the proportion of FDI flows was higher in the first wave of
globalization (35% of net capital outflows); while, in the current process, the weight
of  short-term flows is increasingly important, especially in emerging markets (the
share of FDI net capital outflows has fallen to approximately 3.5% of total net
capital outflows). Secondly, the destination of flows has changed. In the first wave,
savings in the North were invested as FDI in developing countries (from mother
countries to their respective colonies). In the current financial internationalization
process, a high proportion of FDI flows goes from and to developed countries, with
the exception of a small share that goes from industrialized countries to some
emerging economies (table 3.2.).
Taking into account the purpose of this study, we are not going to analyze the
evolution of migration processes in depth. However, we think that it is important to
underline that migration is the most obvious difference between the two waves of
globalization. These differences are both quantitative (volume of total migration)
and qualitative (change of direction). The period 1880-1914 was characterized by
massive movements of human capital. These movements were from European
countries to America and Oceania. Still, in the second wave of globalization, there
is just one important recipient country, that is, the United States, and total flows
                                                       
42 In Table 3.1., the volume of capital flows is measured by the value of national
current accounts which is, by definition, a measure of the nation’s net capital inflow
or outflow. This measure does not accurately reflect the total volume of capital
flows (this would be measured by the sum of capital inflows and capital outflows in
each country). However, as there is little empirical evidence on the features of the
first globalization era, we will use those data to have an approximate idea of the
degree of financial internationalization in each wave from a comparative
perspective.64
account for just 4% of human capital flows recorded in the first wave (Baldwin and
Martin, 1999).
A.2. The inclusion of emerging markets in the current process of financial
globalization
A.2.1. Characteristics
One good measure of financial globalization is the volume of capital flows. So we
will study the volume of cross-border capital flows to the Third World and also their
destination and composition. Moreover, we will briefly analyze the financial
derivatives markets and their relative importance in emerging economies.
There has been an important increase in all types of cross-border flows in the last
three decades, with special emphasis during the eighties. As for FDI, annual flows
represented 2% of world capital formation in 1985, a percentage that rose to 5% in
1995. FDI stock, as a proportion to gross world product, grew from 6% in 1985 to
10% in 1995. Cross-border transactions in financial assets represented less than
10% of GDP in Japan, the US and Germany in 1980. In the early 1990s, they
reached 80% of GDP in Japan, 135% in the US and 170% in Germany (Bustelo
and Olivié, 1999). Finally, regarding foreign exchange trading, there was an
increase from a daily US$ 15 billion in 1973 to US$ 1.3 trillion in 1995 (Eatwell,
1996).
Apart from the great increase in all type of cross-border flows, during the nineties
there has also been a sudden rise in capital flows to emerging economies. Total
net private capital flows to emerging markets in the 1990-96 period soared to US$
1,055 billion, more than seven times the amount they received over the 1973-1981
period (Das, 1998). We will now take a closer look at the features of these capital
flows. As to their composition, we shall underline two basic features. On the one
hand, there has been a shift from public to private flows, compared to previous
decades. In 1996 private capital flows accounted for more than 100% of total net
flows, whereas at the end of the eighties they represented less than 50% (López-
Mejía, 1999). On the other hand, the nineties decade is characterized by the surge
of FDI and portfolio investment (particularly the latter) whereas the seventies and
the eighties were characterized by the flows of “other investments” (mainly bank
loans) to developing countries. As shown in table 3.3., the total amount of net
portfolio investment in developing countries increased more than 30 times in the
period 1978-1997. In the same period, there was an 800% increase in net direct
investment while net other investment decreased from US$ 30.5 billion in the
period 1978-82 to US$ 26.7 billion in 1990-1997.
As to their destination, there are two remarkable elements in such flows to the
Third World. On the one hand, there is a concentration of capital flows in some
emerging economies, mainly Latin America and Asia. Both regions together65
accounted for 85% and 95% of net private capital flows to all developing countries
in 1990 and 1996
43, respectively (table 3.4.). Moreover, they accounted for 74% of
total net private capital flows to emerging markets in 1990 and 82% in 1996 (Das,
1998). On the other hand, there was a switch of flows from Latin America to Asia
in the period 1993-1995. As shown in table 3.4., in 1993, Latin America received
around 40% of total net private capital flows while Asia accounted for 36% of the
same amount. In 1995, those figures had moved to 26% and 62%, respectively.
This was a consequence of the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 and the resulting
Tequila effect. This shift of flows also led to different capital inflows profiles in both
regions: short-term debt stopped growing in Latin America and increased in Asia
(Rodrik and Velasco, 1999).
Another good indicator of  the degree of financial globalization is the size and
evolution of the financial derivatives markets. The origin of derivative products
(options, futures and swaps) dates from the beginning of the 1970s, when the
Bretton Woods system collapsed. The management of the exchange rate risk was
then privatized and the private sector had to create new tools to handle with it. The
increase in the volume of capital traded through the use of derivatives during the
1980s and the 1990s is striking. The notional principal outstanding in financial
derivatives rose to US$ 56,500 billion in 1995 from US$ 1,000 billion in 1986
(Eatwell, 1996). The reason why the size of these markets is a good indicator of
financial globalization is that derivative products have a cross-border feature. For
instance, 51.22% of the notional value of OTC
44 (over-the-counter) derivative
products in March 1995 (US$ 47.5 trillion) were cross-border products (Garber,
1998). Besides, most of these OTC cross-border transactions occurred between
industrial countries (Garber, 1998). The same phenomenon is recorded in
organized markets of financial derivatives: in 1991, 77% of the most relevant
derivative instruments were traded in North America and Europe. This percentage
rose to 86% in 1998. Although Asia’s participation in this kind of transactions
slightly increased in the mid-1990s (it rose from 23% in 1993 and 1994 to 25% in
1995), it quickly fell to lower levels than the ones recorded at the beginning of the
decade (13% in 1998) (BIS, 1999)
45. Thus, we can conclude that the only relevant
indicator of financial integration between industrialized countries and the Third
World is the increase in financial flows from developed to emerging countries.
                                                       
43 We have consciously selected the 1996 figure (instead of 1997 or the average
of the period) in order to show the evolution of net private capital flows in the
period of time that goes from the end of the Latin American debt crisis to the
beginning of the East Asian crises.
44 Over-the-counter derivative products refer to the legal selling of derivatives
which are not listed in the official stock exchange lists.
45 This information is extracted from the BIS 69
th Annual Report, table VII.6. In this
table, Asia includes Australia and New Zealand, thus the participation of the
ASEAN-4 countries plus South Korea in the derivative markets is probably much
lower.66
A.2.2. Factors
The factors behind the sharp increase of financial flows from developed countries
to emerging economies have been commonly classified in push and pull factors
(Das, 1998). Push factors are those circumstances that made developed countries
savings seek for investment projects in emerging countries or elsewhere (mainly
other developed countries). Pull factors are those particularities of emerging
economies that made these markets attractive to foreign capital.
We have identified three major push factors. In the first place, there was a process
of financial liberalization in most developed countries that started in the seventies.
The United States, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
liberalized their financial systems in the seventies. Those countries were followed
by Japan (1980) and other European countries, that is, France, Italy, Spain and
Portugal in the beginning of the nineties. Moreover, the already mentioned
collapse of the Bretton Woods system stimulated foreign exchange trading and the
creation of derivative instruments. Secondly, the fall in economic growth in OECD
countries during the first half of the decade led to a reduction in profitable
investment opportunities in industrialized countries. Thus, these countries
increased their capital exports to other regions, mainly emerging markets (Das,
1998). The third push factor is the growing importance of institutional investors
(mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies) which have
promoted capital outflows in developed countries, according to López-Mejía
(1999). These investors saw in the emerging countries the opportunity to diversify
their portfolios and to take advantage of the interest rate differential relative to
OECD countries’ interest rates.
There were also some characteristics of the emerging countries that made them
more attractive for industrialized countries in the beginning of the nineties. In the
first place, as already shown in section I of this paper, emerging countries also
featured a process of financial liberalization. López-Mejía (1999) identifies two
other factors that stimulated capital inflows in those economies: the improvement
of creditworthiness as a result of external debt restructuring and better
macroeconomic indicators as a consequence of stabilization and adjustment
programs in emerging economies. However, those two factors could explain the
reasons behind capital inflows in Latin America, but not in Asia and we have
already seen that, as an average, from 1990 to 1997, Asian emerging economies
received a higher proportion of capital flows than Latin America (table 3.4.). Still, it
is true that emerging economies as a whole presented sound macroeconomic
indicators at the beginning of the decade. The number of emerging market
countries with Moody’s credit ratings rose from 11 in 1989 to 52 in 1997 (Das,
1998).67
Apart from push and pull factors, there is one important global factor which is
worth mentioning, and which stimulated both interregional flows and capital
exports from developed to developing countries: the reduction in communication
costs, as a consequence of  technological advances. This has improved the
capability of both investors and creditors to manage their portfolios and has
transformed the way in which financial information is processed (Das, 1998).
B. From Financial Globalization to the Increased Risk of Crises in Emerging
Markets
In this section, we focus on one important adverse consequence of financial
globalization, that is, the increased vulnerability of emerging countries to financial
crises. Conventional theory, on the contrary, states that financial globalization may
have some important benefits. Based on the efficient market hypothesis, this
strand of thought argues that, through financial liberalization, internationalization of
capital has important macroeconomic benefits. In a global financial market, capital
will have the opportunity to fly to countries where most productive investments are
located. That is, internationalization of capital leads to a better allocation of
resources which in the long run will bring about higher economic growth through
higher investment.
Empirically, as regards to productive investment, Eatwell (1996) suggests that
there is little international market capital integration. In the first place, despite the
great volume of international financial flows that the current globalization process
has brought about, there have not been substantial changes in net capital flows on
a global scale. Secondly, a high proportion of investment worldwide is still being
domestically financed instead of internationally financed, as the conventional
hypothesis would suggest. Moreover, financial globalization has not been
accompanied by higher rates of investment and growth (Eatwell, 1996). According
to Felix (1995) investment, as a proportion of GDP, has tended to decrease both in
OECD countries and emerging economies during the period 1960-1995, with
particular emphasis in the eighties, precisely when international financial
liberalization was more pronounced. The only region that seems to have escaped
from this tendency is East Asia, where investment has increased steadily since the
early sixties.
It seems, then, that the benefits that financial globalization was supposed to bring
about, from an orthodox point of view, have not been accomplished. Moreover,
there is an heterodox strand of thought which argues that financial globalization
may have negative consequences. In the first place, Hermalin and Rose (1999)
have underlined the so-called deflationary bias that financial movements can
impose on real economies. According to Eatwell (1996), international financial
agents can impose a certain behavior on a government. Suppose an economy is
benefiting from higher activity, financial agents may expect then a future rise in
interest rates. They will react selling their bonds in the market, provoking a rise in68
long-term government interest rates (this is a typical case of self-fulfilling process).
The consequences will be a rise in fiscal deficit and an increase in the exchange
rate, both leading to a decrease in economic activity. Secondly, we think there is a
positive relation between financial globalization and an increase in the risk of
financial crises in emerging economies. We will try to analyze this hypothesis later
on.
B.1. From globalization of financial markets to the increase in volatility
One recurrent academic issue in the last decades has been the debate on the
relation between globalization of financial markets and the evolution of volatility.
There is no consensus among economists whether globalization of financial
markets reduces volatility or not. Volatility of a financial asset is defined by the risk
of this asset and is measured by the risk premium which is added to the
governmental interest rate. Conventional theory argues that liberalization and
internationalization of capital movements lead to a decrease in volatility. As
volatility is measured by the risk premium, this means that there should also be a
fall in international interest rates (that is, the cost of capital) after the liberalization
of capital markets (Stulz, 1999). The reason is that through liberalization, capital
suppliers have access to a larger number of possible investments and by
diversifying, they can reduce the risk of their portfolio.
However, there is another strand of thought (Hermalin and Rose, 1999) which
states that globalization of financial markets exacerbates intrinsic distortions of
domestic financial markets which lead to an increase in volatility of financial
assets. From this point of view, there are three channels through which these
distortions are enhanced: the increase in asymmetric information, the use of
derivatives and the role played by institutional investors. We will now analyze more
deeply the heterodox hypothesis on financial volatility through the examination of
each one of such channels.
B.1.1. Asymmetric information
According to Hermalin and Rose (1999), any financial market suffers from an
intrinsic problem, that is, asymmetric information
46. The asymmetry of information
simply highlights the fact that information in financial markets is not perfect; that is
to say, it is unevenly distributed among agents. For example, in any lending
                                                       
46 In fact, Hermalin and Rose (1999) betray two intrinsic distortions in financial
markets: the asymmetry of information and the problem related to the enforcement
of contracts. The latter refers to the institutional and legal environment in which the
financial contract is signed. If such institutional framework is weak, this will imply a
cost for the lender which will be higher the weaker the institutional framework. We
have not introduced such concept in our analysis for plot reasons: there is no
reason for that problem to be exacerbated in a globalized financial market.69
contract, the borrower will always have better information than the lender about
the expected returns of the project he wants to borrow for.
Mishkin (1996 and 1998) further develops the asymmetric information issue. From
Mishkin’s point of view (Mishkin, 1996 and 1998), asymmetric information leads to
two major problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. As regards to adverse
selection, Mishkin (1996 and 1998) defines it in the following way: “adverse
selection is an asymmetric information problem that occurs before the transaction
occurs when potential bad credit risks are the ones who most actively seek out a
loan“ (Mishkin, 1998, p. 2). In other words, lenders with scarce information about
the particular conditions of a given economy will supply their funds to those
borrowers who offer higher interest rates. As the interest rate reflects the risk of a
project, this means that scarcely informed lenders will provide funds for low-quality
projects associated to high risk of default. If the returns of the project exceed the
cost of the loan, the benefits will be distributed among the lender and the
borrower. On the contrary, if the project fails, the losses will be beared exclusively
by the lender. This situation leads to the moral hazard problem: the borrower will
have little incentive for investing in high-quality projects. As he will not bear the
losses in case of default, he will simply choose for his investment the project with
higher expected returns, that is the riskier one.
The lack of information derived from the asymmetry of information implies a cost
for the lender. The lender then has two options: either he can spend an additional
amount of money in order to acquire further information about the expected
returns of the borrower’s project or he can simply run on a higher risk. In both
cases, the increase will be greater the wider the asymmetry of information
(Hermalin and Rose, 1999). The lender will normally choose the second option,
therefore incurring in a higher risk. The reason why is explained by the free-rider
problem. The free-rider issue was first highlighted by Akerlof (1970). This problem
arises when an economic agent uses other agents’ information in order not to
spend his own resources. In many markets, economic agents use market
information to judge the quality of potential future purchases. As a consequence,
economic agents operating in such markets will have little incentive to invest in
further information, as the returns of their investment will be shared by many other
agents. The net result will be that there will be little amounts of capital invested in
acquiring more information and, thus, the average quality of the products
purchased will be lower. In lending markets, this problem would spring up when a
certain lender has little information about a determined borrower (or market of
borrowers) and decides to follow other lenders decisions, counting on their better
information, rather than acquiring his own data
47. This problem is particularly
serious in auction markets rather than in markets involving financial intermediaries.
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In auction markets, such as securities markets, information is more easily
outspreaded: a potential lender may have access to further information about the
quality of a possible borrower through, for instance, the price level of its obligations
in the market. On the contrary, lending contracts enhanced through financial
intermediaries are private commitments: other potential lenders will not benefit
from the information collected by one lender about the quality of the borrower.
As we said before, asymmetric information is exacerbated when the domestic
financial market becomes international, according to this heterodox point of view
(Hermalin and Rose, 1999). The asymmetry of information widens when the lender
and the borrower belong to two very different economies. The lender then has less
information about the borrower than he would have if the borrower belonged to
the local market. From this point of view, the result is that the volatility associated
to financial operations is higher in global markets than in domestic financial
markets.
Nonetheless, conventional theory has also analyzed the impact of
internationalization of capital flows on the asymmetry of information and has
arrived to different conclusions (Stulz, 1999). It has focused on the asymmetry of
information in equity markets, where the asymmetry of information is not between
lenders and borrowers but between managers and shareholders. The problem
arises, like in the lending market, when time comes to raise new funds. Managers
have more information than owners about the financial state of the firm and they
use this additional information to over-value the expected returns of the project for
which they are trying to raise money. This is what is called the agency problem.
The reason why managers have incentives to over-value those expected returns is
that, even if the project is not as profitable as the owners expect, it will make the
firm grow and this will bring reputational benefits for the managers.
From this point of view and contrary to Hermalin and Rose (1999) opinion, Stulz
(1999) believes that this problem, instead of being exacerbated through
liberalization of capital flows and globalization, is corrected by the
internationalization of financial markets. Financial globalization means that there
will be more foreign managers and shareholders operating in the domestic market
and also that domestic managers and shareholders will operate more intensively
in foreign markets. As the number of economic agents increases, competitiveness
will also increase and local managers will be forced to improve their management.
As a consequence, asymmetric information and transaction costs in general will be
lowered. Firstly, competitiveness puts pressure on managers not only to achieve a
better performance, but also to achieve a more transparent management: as there
will be many more businesses operating in share markets if these are
internationalized, there is more information about enterprises and thus asymmetric
information is reduced. Secondly, higher competitiveness in the banking sector will
lead to a reduction of transaction costs generated by this sector: spreads will be
lowered and information will become cheaper.71
B.1.2. Derivatives
According to Hermalin and Rose (1999), the second channel through which
volatility in financial markets is widened when such markets become international
is the use of derivatives. An increased use of derivatives leads to higher cross-
border capital flows (Garber, 1998), thus leading to a rise in the asymmetry of
information and therefore in financial volatility.
The mechanism through which derivative instruments bring about higher
international capital flows is explained by Garber (1998) through the functioning of
several derivatives. One example is how a plain vanilla swap (currency swap)
operates. Suppose that an American company in need of new funds decides to
sell bonds. Suppose also that, for any reason, the financial cost of selling bonds
for this company would be lower in Germany than in the United States. The
company then decides to sell bonds in Germany. Nevertheless, German buyers
insist on having payments in DM. On the contrary, the American company prefers
dollar payments, as its sales are in this currency. To solve the problem, the
American company enters a currency swap with an American bank. This is
equivalent to a stack of forward exchange contracts. In every bond settlement, the
American company will pay a pre-determined amount of dollars to the American
bank that will, in turn pay a pre-determined amount of DM to the American
company. The company will use those DM to face the bonds settlements. This
swap operation allows economic agents to benefit from more advantageous
economic conditions in foreign markets. Without the existence of swap contracts,
the American company would probably have sold bonds in the American market
with a higher cost and no international operation would have been recorded. This
is an example of how the development of the derivative markets leads to an
increase of international capital flows.
From Garber’s (1998) point of view, currency derivatives are not the only type of
derivative products that lead to an increase in international capital operations.
Other types of derivatives have the same consequence. One example might be an
interest rate swap. Suppose that, for any reason, there is an American company
willing to obtain a loan in the German market. Suppose, also, that there is a
German company wishing to do the same operation in the United States.
Nonetheless, the American company can obtain a loan in the American market at
a lower cost than the German company. The German company is in the same
situation: the cost of obtaining new funds in Germany is lower for the German
company than for the American company. For this reason, the two companies will
enter an interest rate swap: the German company will get into debt with a German
bank for the amount needed by the American company while the latter will sign a
loan with an American bank for the amount needed by the German company. The
two companies will first exchange the amount of the loan. That is, the American
company will deliver dollars to the German company while the German company72
will deliver DM to the American company. Moreover, in every settlement, the two
companies will swap the payments. In this way, both companies will obtain the
funds they need at a lower cost. Without the existence of the interest rate swap,
the cost for the American company of contracting a loan in the German market
would be higher, and therefore may push the company to raise funds in the
domestic market, thus preventing cross-border capital flows. The same applies to
the German firm. Therefore, the use of interest rate derivative instruments
enhances cross-border capital flows.
Summing up, the use of derivatives (currency-related or not) leads to an increase
in cross-border capital flows. According to Hermalin and Rose (1999), the
globalization of financial markets, that is the increase in international capital flows,
widens the asymmetry of information and thus increases volatility. Therefore, the
use of derivative instruments implies an increase in volatility.
B.1.3. Institutional investors
According to Hermalin and Rose (1999), the third mechanism through which
volatility is emphasized in global financial markets is through the role played by
institutional investors (hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance
companies...). Just like it happens with the relation between financial globalization
and volatility, there is no academic consensus on whether the role played by
institutional investors in financial markets increases volatility or not. The
conventional strand of thought has argued that institutional investors’ activity in
financial markets has permitted a decrease in volatility. The arguments brandished
have been mainly three: “Many institutional investors are governed by Prudent
Man rules and thus may be attracted to less-risky stocks, greater institutional
ownership may imply greater information gathering and smaller information
assessment errors and institutional investors are typically viewed as rational (less
subject to fads or noise trading) than individual investors” (Sias, 1996, p.13).
On this scope, heterodox economists (Sias, 1996) have stated, on the one hand,
that the role played by institutional investors may result in an increase in volatility.
This type of financial agents tend to trade larger volumes of capital than individual
investors. Thus, their activity in financial markets may result in higher rises or
decreases in asset prices. In addition, in spite of their greater information
gathering, they might also engage in noise trading. On the other hand, institutional
investors might be particularly subject to herding behavior. Firstly, because of the
close-knit nature of the institutional community. Secondly as a result of asymmetric
incentives, that is, the losses attributable to underperformance are greater than the
gains of overperformance. Thirdly, because of their characteristic shortermism.73
B.1.4. Empirical evidence and conclusions
We should now try to test the relations between each one of Hermalin and Rose’s
factors (the asymmetry of information, the use of derivatives and the role played
by institutional investors) and the evolution of volatility. However, we cannot test
statistically the link between asymmetric information and financial volatility: the first
variable is a qualitative one, while the latter is quantitative and the link between
both is qualitative. As to the use of derivatives, the same problem arises: the
channel through which the use of derivatives affects volatility is through the
increase in cross-border flows, and thus in asymmetric information. Therefore, the
way to empirically contrast this relation would be, again, to find correlations
between the asymmetry of information and volatility. As to the last factor (the role
played by institutional investors), we can simply observe the relative weight of
institutional investors in financial markets and the evolution of volatility in order to
find a relationship between both. Sias (1996) has examined this relationship and
has arrived to two basic conclusions. In the first place, higher participation of
institutional investors in financial markets is related to higher volatility. Secondly,
institutional investors activity precedes increased volatility. The latter observation
means that institutional investors provoke an increase in volatility, rather than
being attracted by high-risky assets. Moreover, the herd behavior of institutional
investors has also been tested (Aitken, 1996). Aitken finds out that institutional
investors  portfolio assets are highly and positively correlated which is an indicator
of herd behavior. Nevertheless, it has also been shown that both derivative
products and institutional investors have played a negligible role in the bursting of
the Asian crises. As to the markets of derivatives, we have already seen (in
section A.2.1.) that those markets are still underdeveloped in emerging
economies. As regards to institutional investors, Brown et al. (1998) show that
there is no empirical evidence to support “the hypothesis that George Soros, or
any other hedge fund manager was responsible for the crisis” (Brown et al., 1998,
p. 1).
We should then try to find out whether financial globalization provokes an increase
in volatility or not, no matter through which mechanisms. As have not found
empirical evidence correlating both variables, we will then simply observe the
evolution of volatility in the last decades, when financial liberalization has been
more pronounced. There is some but little empirical evidence on the evolution of
volatility both in developed and emerging economies. According to Eatwell (1996)
and with regard to industrialized countries, volatility in exchange rate, bond yield
and share markets seems to have been unchanged since the breaking-off of the
Bretton Woods system, excluding the 1992-93 period. However, the same author
observes a much higher volatility in stock prices in emerging markets than the one
that is observed for the same period in developed countries.
Well then, it seems that, concerning emerging markets, Hermalin and Rose’s
(1999) conclusions on the asymmetry of information in global financial markets74
prevail over those maintained by the conventional strand of thought. Moreover, we
believe that the reduction of risk through portfolio diversification only applies
ceteris paribus. In other words, risk diminishes only if a certain amount of
resources is spent in order to keep the asymmetry of information at the same level
as it was before (in a domestic market). But in a global market, the amount of
resources needed to maintain the same level of asymmetry is much higher: there
are many more unknown borrowers operating in many more unknown institutional
and legal contexts. So, according to FitzGerald (1999), institutional investors
prefer to invest small amounts of resources in additional information and choose
short-term placements so that they will be able to retire their funds in case of
trouble. The net result will probably be a reduction of average volatility when the
funds are invested in non-national but “known” markets, that is, intra-American,
intra-European or intra-Asian investments. On the contrary, volatility will be higher
in inter-zones operations, for instance, American placements in South East Asia.
B.2. From financial globalization to the deterioration of banks balance sheets
B.2.1. The theory of financial vulnerability
We have analyzed, so far, how globalization of financial markets can lead to an
increase in volatility through the increase in the asymmetry of information in
international financial markets. In his turn, Mishkin (1996 and 1998) focuses on the
same problem but from a domestic point of view. The author builds up a theory
linking domestic financial liberalization to financial vulnerabilities through the
problems related to the asymmetry of information in financial markets. Mishkin
(1996 and 1998) identifies four factors that, in a context of domestic financial
liberalization, can contribute to an increase in adverse selection and moral
hazard
48 and thus lead to vulnerabilities in the financial domestic system that will
be converted, in the last analysis, into a financial crisis. Those four factors are: (1)
increases in interest rates; (2) increases in uncertainty; (3) asset market effects on
balance sheets; and (4) problems in the banking sector. For the purpose of our
analysis we will just focus on one issue of  Mishkin’s theory of financial instability,
that is, the mechanisms through which those factors lead to a worsening of the
adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
As regards to the first factor mentioned above, Mishkin (1998) considers that an
increase in interest rates may exacerbate the adverse selection problem, as good
borrowers with safe projects will be less likely to borrow because the expected
returns of the project might be lower than the increased cost of borrowing. Better
borrowers will then abandon the lending market while bad borrowers will keep on
searching for credit. Thus, the average quality of the loans will decrease, leading
to an increase in financial vulnerability. As for uncertainty (the second factor), the
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author states that the emergence of, for instance,  political or financial problems,
market rumors or market crashes, widen the adverse selection and moral hazard
problems as lenders have more difficulties to screen out good from bad borrowers.
The third factor is the asset market effect on balance sheets. From Mishkin’s point
of view, the moral hazard problem weakens when the net worth of borrowers’ firms
increases and, thus, increases when the net worth of the firms decreases: the
lower the net worth of a firm, the stronger the adverse selection and the moral
hazard problems. This is so because every time they borrow to invest in a new
project, firms are risking their own funds, in addition to the lender’s money. Thus,
the higher the net worth of a borrower’s firm, the higher the proportion of own
funds (compared to lender’s funds) the firm is risking in every investment. As a
result, high net worth firms are more risk-adverse while highly leveraged firms are
less cautious with their investments, as they are committing, above all, the lender’s
funds instead of theirs. A factor that may provoke a fall in firms net worth is a stock
market decline. The proportion of own funds the companies will be committing in
new investment projects will be, then, lower. As a consequence, the borrowers will
be less cautious and less risk adverse. They will, therefore, seek for riskier
placements and the adverse selection and moral hazard problems will be
enhanced in the lending market. The fourth, and last, factor that can lead to an
increase in adverse selection and moral hazard in the lending market is the
upsurge of problems in the banking sector. The banking system plays an important
role in producing information, both in industrial countries and emerging markets. A
decline in the banking activity and thus in intermediation will cut their information-
producing activity in the system thus leading to an increase in asymmetric
information and therefore, in adverse selection and moral hazard.
Mishkin (1996 and 1998) states that the emergence of any of these four factors
may lead to an increase in financial vulnerability. Moreover, in addition to the direct
effect of any of those factors in adverse selection and moral hazard, combined
effects of two or more of those factors may appear. For instance, an increase in
uncertainty can lead to a stock market decline, thus provoking a fall in firms net
value and, therefore, an increase in moral hazard.
B.2.2. An application to the East Asian crises
The same author (Mishkin, 1999) has applied his theory of financial vulnerability to
the Asian crisis. He has identified the phenomena that led to the appearance of
any of the four factors described above, thus provoking a situation of financial
fragility. As we have just said, according to this author, the upsurge of any of the
four factors leads to a situation of financial vulnerability.  From his point of view,
there is one important factor that emerged in Asia, provoking ultimately a financial
crisis. This factor was the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets, that is, the fourth
factor identified as problems in the banking sector. Mishkin also describes the
process that impinged upon a deterioration in banks balance sheets: “the story
starts with financial liberalization that resulted in the lending boom which was fed76
by capital inflows.” (Mishkin, 1999, p. 2). That is, after the abolishment of
restrictions to capital inflows, high volumes of foreign capital entered the Asian
emerging economies, mainly in the form of debt. The consequence was a lending
boom: domestic credit started to grow faster than GDP. According to this author,
the lending boom combined with two particular features of emerging financial
systems provoked an excessive risk-taking. Firstly, the lack of expertise of banking
institutions to manage great inflows of foreign debt. As a result, the national
banking network engages in great amounts of foreign debt which are invested in
risky domestic projects. Secondly, emerging countries often lack an adequate
regulatory and supervisory system. In such cases, there is an implicit safety
network perceived by foreign investors that leads to a situation of moral hazard
49.
Thus, investors engage in highly risky operations (Figure 1).
Excessive risk taking leads to the deterioration of banks balance sheets, having a
particularly devastating effect in emerging financial systems. According to Mishkin
(1996, 1998 and 1999), the main difference in banking intermediation between
industrial countries and emerging economies is the mismatch in both currencies
and maturities. In industrial countries, with historically low rates of inflation and
solid currencies, the banking system receives short and long-term deposits in
national currency from national savers and lends in the same currency, either to
domestic or foreign borrowers, also on a long-term basis. On the contrary,
emerging countries usually receive foreign short-term funds in foreign currencies
(usually dollars, DM or yen). The reason is that emerging countries historically
have suffered from fragile currencies and episodes of high rates of inflation. In
such uncertain context, foreign investors rather prefer to lend short-term funds in
strong currencies. Besides, emerging banking systems grant long-termed loans
denominated in domestic currency to national borrowers. The net result is a
greater currency and maturity mismatch in emerging financial systems than in
industrial financial nets. As a consequence, we believe that the impact of an
excessive risk taking is more serious in emerging economies and thus leads to a
greater deterioration in banks balance sheets. According to Mishkin (1996, 1998
and 1999), this will lead to an increase in both adverse selection and moral
hazard, therefore provoking a situation of financial vulnerability.
B.3. From globalization of financial markets to financial crises: a combined
explanation
We have analyzed so far, and separately, three important issues related to the
asymmetry of information. In the first place, there is a heterodox strand of thought
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Financial agents engage in risky operations because they feel indorsed by the
authorities.77
which maintains that the asymmetry of information - an intrinsic characteristic of
any financial market - is exacerbated when financial markets become global, thus
leading to an increase in risk and volatility (Hermalin and Rose, 1999). Secondly,
Mishkin elaborates a theory of financial vulnerability where four different factors –
that can act separately or combined - can impinge upon an increase in adverse
selection and moral hazard. Finally, the same author applies his theory of financial
fragility to the Asian crisis and identifies the deterioration of banks balance sheets
as the main vehicle of the rise in adverse selection and moral hazard, thus leading
to an increase in financial vulnerability. We believe that Hermalin and Rose’s
(1999) hypothesis on globalization and volatility focuses on the asymmetry of
information problem from an international point of view. On the contrary, Mishkin
deals with the same problem from a domestic point of view. Then, both theories
could be combined in order to explain how asymmetric information can affect a
financial system from two flanks (international and domestic) and lead to an
increase in financial vulnerability. We could also try to apply this combined
explanation to the particular case of the East Asian crises while introducing some
other empirical variables that Mishkin did not consider in his empirical analysis
(Mishkin, 1999) (Figure 2).
B.3.1. From financial globalization to financial vulnerabilities
As shown in section I, East Asian emerging economies undertook a substantial
financial liberalization at the beginning of the current decade. This process of
liberalization included both domestic deregulation and capital account opening and
led, as also stated by Mishkin (1999) to a sudden increase in foreign capital
inflows  (table 1.6) which resulted in a lending boom (table 1.16). The rise in
lending, together with the lack of expertise and with a weak regulatory framework,
provoked an excessive risk taking in financial operations and, finally, a
deterioration of banks balance sheets.
However, we think that some nuances could be introduced in Mishkin’s
explanation. In the first place, we think that financial liberalization in those
countries was the result of two combined phenomena. On the one hand, East
Asian policymakers considered for some reason (mainly to increase competition in
the financial sector in order to reduce lending interest rates) that financial
deregulation was a necessary step to undertake in their economies, that is,
liberalization was, in part, promoted by internal factors. On the other hand, the
process of financial opening was also a consequence of the process of
globalization that the international economy had featured since the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system, simply because attracting capital flows was becoming
much more competitive and was considered much easier in an open-economy
framework.
Secondly, we think that the increase in capital inflows in emerging markets and,
more specifically in East Asia, was not merely the result of domestic financial78
liberalization but also a consequence of financial globalization through the
increase in cross-border flows. After the process of financial liberalization that took
place in the OECD countries in the mid-1970s, there was an increasing volume of
funds looking for higher yields. Then, industrial countries began to invest their
savings in emerging economies, especially in Latin America and East Asia.
Moreover, the increase in asymmetric information provoked by the rise in cross-
border flows led to the particular structure of emerging countries capital inflows
already pointed by Mishkin (that is, short-term funds denominated in developed
countries currencies), indirectly bringing with it the excessive risk taking that
occurs after the lending boom.
Thirdly, although we agree with Mishkin in the fact that the combination of some
internal desequilibria with a sudden increase in credit provoked an excessive risk
taking, we do not think that those internal desequilibria are simply intrinsic features
of emerging financial systems but rather consequences of a an accelerated
process of financial deregulation and opening, as it has already been shown in
section I of this paper. Moreover, apart from the lack of managerial expertise and a
weak regulatory system, other domestic factors contributed to the increase in risk
taking: these were mainly the decrease in the cost of borrowing (as domestic
investors had access to lower interest rates following financial opening) and the
currency peg to the US dollar (which reduced the perceived exchange rate risk).
We have analyzed (in section B.1 above) how heterodox theory links the financial
globalization process with the increase in volatility (through the widening in the
asymmetry of information). From our point of view, volatility could be linked to the
rise in uncertainty, one of Mishkin’s four factors of his theory of financial
vulnerability. In fact, Mishkin also deals with this possibility (Mishkin, 1998).
Although there does not seem to be a strong empirical correlation between
financial globalization and the rise in volatility (and, therefore, in vulnerability), we
believe that there can be a connection between the increase in asymmetric
information and an increase in uncertainty. As we have already pointed out,
investors “know more” about domestic than about foreign markets, thus,
uncertainty increases in cross-border financial operations.
Up to here, we can see that two of Mishkin’s four factors (deterioration of bank’s
balance sheets and a rise in uncertainty) arise in the explanation of the East Asian
financial crisis, explained from an asymmetric information problem point of view. In
Mishkin’s theory of financial vulnerability, two other factors (an asset market
decline and a rise in interest rates) could bring with them an increase in adverse
selection and moral hazard and thus a rise in financial fragility. The empirical
evidence suggests that none of those two problems sprang up in East Asia before
the financial crises. As shown in section I (table 1.26), the stock market decline
that took place in the East Asian economies was a consequence of the 1997
speculative attack, rather than an antecedent, with the partial exception of
Thailand and South Korea. In relation to the evolution of interest rates in these79
economies, as shown in table 3.5, there was not an outstanding increase in the
cost of borrowing before the crisis in any of the countries involved. This is probably
explained by the fact that volatility and risk were not correctly assessed and thus,
the excessive risk that was being undertaken was not reflected by an increase in
the risk premia and thus in interest rates.
B.3.2. From financial vulnerability to financial crisis
We have analyzed, so far, how financial globalization leads to an increase in
financial vulnerability by both national and international mechanisms. Moreover,
these two channels can interact propagating asymmetric information from world
markets to the domestic financial system. However, we consider, according to
some second generation models (Calvo, 1998a and Chang and Velasco, 1998)
explained in section II, that the financial vulnerability recorded in East Asian
countries in 1997, may not lead by itself to a speculative attack and thus, to a
financial crisis. For the speculative attack to occur, there must also be a shift in
private agents’ expectations.80









 Weak regulatory and
 supervisory system81
















• Lack of expertise


















D Financial vulnerability ￿
D Risk of financial crisis
Speculative attack
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Shift in private agents’
expectations82
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has tried to suggest that a new approach is needed in order to identify
the causes of the East Asian financial crises. With that aim we have done, first, an
empirical study which highlights the specific and “not-so-bad” fundamentals (both
different from those in the ERM in 1992-1993 and Mexico in 1994-1995, and
“intermediate”) that made East Asia prone to a financial crisis. Second, we have
analyzed models of financial crises in order to explain how, theoretically,
fundamentals may not be sufficient for causing a crisis. Finally, we have studied
the financial international context which, added to those “not-so-bad” fundamentals
and to a shift in private agents’ expectations, has caused the East Asian crises.
Our empirical analysis concludes, on the one hand, that the nature of the East
Asian crises was essentially different from that of previous turmoils in the 1990s.
The ERM crisis was related to restrictive monetary policies in Europe in a context
of global recession. The Mexican crisis was associated to overconsumption. The
East Asian crises were a result of private overinvestment and overproduction. On
the other hand, we have suggested that a careful analysis of the East Asian
episodes should emphasize specific unsound fundamentals, such as a lending
boom associated with high capital inflows and financial deregulation, a declining
capital efficiency (as a result of overinvestment), and a large short-term foreign
debt (especially as a proportion of foreign exchange reserves).
Besides, the empirical analysis also concludes that, like previous crises of the
1990s, the East Asian crises could have been avoided if a soft landing would have
been carried out. That is, those “bad” fundamentals (whether conventional or not)
were not as “bad” as to provoke inevitably a crisis by themselves.
Two questions arise from these conclusions: How is it possible that fundamentals
which were not considered dangerous, neither by empirical nor by most theoretical
studies, turned out to be the starting point of every explanation of the East Asian
crises? What are the mechanisms that turned “not-so-bad” fundamentals into a
crisis?
Both questions are, at least partially, answered by some theoretical models of
financial crises. On the one hand, first generation models (even those
emphasizing mechanisms different from large public deficits) are not useful for
understanding the crises of the 1990s, mainly because they consider crises as
predictable and unavoidable events. On the other hand, second generation
models do not give a complete view of reality (neither for the East Asian crises nor
for the previous ones). Nevertheless, second generation models explain that an
intermediate state of any sort of fundamentals opens the door to the self-fulfillment
of expectations. That is, no matter what kind of problems is the country in question
suffering, a shift in private agents’ expectations may lead to a crisis through the
increase of the cost of maintaining the fixed exchange rate regime. Moreover,83
neither fundamentals need to be of a specific kind (they can be non-conventional)
nor they need to be very “bad” for a crisis to happen. Second generation models
show that crises may erupt even when fundamentals are not as “bad” as to cause
crises by themselves: it is enough that fundamentals are not “very good” for
expectations to be self-fulfilling. The second part of this paper concludes that, for
explaining the East Asian episodes (apart from others), there is something that
theoretical models are missing. These models explain the role of fundamentals in
relation to private expectations. But they do not explain how is it possible that a
shift in private agents’ expectations turns into a financial crisis. What is it that
make countries (especially emerging markets) vulnerable to a shift in
expectations?
Our study of the vulnerabilities that financial globalization brings about tried to
answer, at least partially, such question. There are two ways through which
financial globalization leads to higher vulnerability of countries, so that a shift in
expectations may cause a financial crisis. On the one hand, globalization
increases certain market failures inherent to capital markets. For instance, the lack
of transparency of any financial market is exacerbated when such market
becomes global. Thus, the whole international financial system is affected by non-
efficient mechanisms (free riding, herding...) which increase risk and therefore
uncertainty. On the other hand, globalization (together with perceived national
needs) impinges upon the pace of domestic financial liberalization of emerging
markets and facilitates the flows of capital to them. Both an accelerated and
indiscriminate domestic financial liberalization, and the reception of massive
capital inflows, lead to domestic financial vulnerabilities. Note that such domestic
financial vulnerabilities are a particular case of all the different “not-so-bad”
fundamentals which open the door to self-fulfilling expectations. Therefore, we
conclude that globalization increases the vulnerability of emerging markets to
crises by affecting both international and domestic capital markets.
We have argued, on theoretical and empirical grounds, that this was the case in
East Asia. On the one hand, East Asian policy-makers considered that financial
deregulation was a necessary step to undertake, mainly to increase competition in
the financial sector in order to reduce lending interest rates (that is, liberalization
was, in part, promoted by internal factors). On the other hand, financial opening
was also a consequence of the process of globalization that the world economy
has featured since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, simply because
attracting capital flows was becoming much more competitive and was considered
much easier in an open-economy framework. Besides, the increase in capital
inflows in emerging markets and, more specifically in East Asia, was not merely
the result of domestic financial liberalization but also a consequence of financial
globalization through the increase in cross-border flows.
Therefore, we conclude that globalization increases the vulnerability of emerging
markets to crises by affecting both international and domestic capital markets.84
We can extract some lessons from the conclusions seen above. We have seen
that both domestic factors (“intermediate” fundamentals) and international factors
(those that permit financial panics) play a role in causing financial crises.
Therefore, prevention measures should be adopted both domestically and
internationally. First, governments have the responsibility of exiting crises zones
so as to avoid the self-fulfillment of expectations. Second, governments should
take care of how domestic financial liberalization is carried out. They should not
allow domestic needs and/or globalization to lead to an accelerated and
indiscriminate financial liberalization. Thus, a certain pace and a careful order
must be followed so as to avoid the domestic vulnerabilities that would arise
otherwise. Third, governments must avoid the other way through which
globalization impinges upon domestic financial vulnerability: massive inflows of
capital (mainly in short-term funds). Thus, some capital controls should be
imposed in order to receive the amount and nature of capital least dangerous for
the country in question (this was the case of Chile in 1991-1998 and of Malaysia in
1998-1999). The second and third lessons may be regarded as particular cases of
the first one. That is, by caring about the pace and order of domestic financial
liberalization, and/or caring about the amount and nature of capital inflows,
governments avoid “bad” financial fundamentals, and thus avoid entering a crisis
zone.
Fourth, even when domestic financial vulnerabilities are successfully repressed,
the inherent failures of financial markets are enhanced by globalization, so that
financial vulnerability still exists. Therefore, governments should try to design
collectively a new global financial architecture in order to counteract the negative
effects of such market failures. One could consider that once all governments
have exited the crises zones there is no need of counteracting the effects of
globalization on vulnerability, as expectations can no longer be self-fulfilling.
Nevertheless, it is not easy to determine with precision what is a crisis zone, given
that so many kinds of fundamentals may determine it, and given that there is no
consensus about what are “bad”, “not-so-bad” (or “intermediate”) or “good”
fundamentals.
Therefore, measures should be taken both to improve domestic fundamentals
(either conventional or non-conventional) and to mitigate the adverse effects of
globalization on the financial vulnerability of emerging markets.85
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 1.1. Fiscal balance (as a percentage of GDP)
1990-1995 1996 1997
Indonesia 0.2 0.2 0.0
Malaysia -0.4 0.7 1.8
Philippines -1.1 0.3 0.1
South Korea 0.2 0.5 -1.4
Thailand 3.2 2.4 -0.9
Singapore 9.4 6.8 3.3
Hong Kong 9.4 6.8 6.5
Taiwan -5.0 -6.6 -6.3
China -1.0 -0.8 -0.7
Source: ADB (1999), table 1.2.
Table 1.2. Public debt (as a percentage of GDP)
1994 1995 1996
Indonesia 36.6 30.9 24.1
Malaysia 50.1 42.8 n.a.
Philippines 56.4 n.a. n.a.
South Korea 10.0 9.0 8.6
Thailand 5.8 4.7 3.7
Source: IFS.94
Table 1.3. Inflation rates
1990-1995 1996 1997
Indonesia 8.7 7.9 6.6
Malaysia 3.7 3.5 4.0
Philippines 10.6 9.1 6.0
South Korea 6.6 5.0 4.5
Thailand 5.0 5.9 5.6
Singapore 2.7 1.4 2.0
Hong Kong 9.3 6.3 5.9
Taiwan 3.8 3.1 0.9
China 11.3 8.3 2.8
Source: ADB (1999), table 1.2.
Table 1.4. Savings and investment rates (as percentages of GDP)
1990-95 1990-95 1996 1996 1997 1997
S/GDP I/GDP S/GDP I/GDP S/GDP I/GDP
Indonesia 31.0 31.3 27.3 30.7 29.9 31.3
Malaysia 36.6 37.5 42.6 41.5 43.8 42.0
Philippines 16.6 22.4 18.5 23.1 20.3 23.8
S. Korea 35.6 36.8 33.7 38.4 33.1 35.0
Thailand 34.4 41.0 33.7 41.7 32.9 35.0
Singapore 47.0 34.9 51.2 35.3 51.8 37.4
Hong Kong 33.6 29.6 30.7 32.1 31.8 35.2
Taiwan 26.9 24.0 25.1 21.2 24.8 22.0
China 40.8 38.8 40.5 39.6 41.5 38.2
Source: ADB (1999), table 1.3.95
Table 1.5. GDP growth, 1990-1997
1990-1995 1996 1997
Indonesia 8.0 7.8 4.9
Malaysia 8.9 8.6 7.7
Philippines 2.3 5.8 5.3
South Korea 7.8 7.1 5.5
Thailand 9.0 5.5 -0.4
Singapore 8.6 6.9 7.8
Hong Kong, China 5.0 4.5 5.3
Taiwan 6.4 5.7 6.8
China 10.7 9.6 8.8
Source: ADB (1999), table 1.2.
Table 1.6. Net private capital inflows (as percentage of GDP)
1975-82 1983-91 1992-96
Indonesia 1.1 2.6 4.8
Malaysia 5.1 4.1 10.5
Philippines 5.5 -0.8 4.8
South Korea 5.7 -0.4 3.2
Thailand 4.0 5.7 8.8
Source: Chowdury (1999), table 10.
Table 1.7. Unemployment rates
1995 1996 1997
Indonesia n.a. 4.1 4.9
Malaysia 2.8 2.5 2.6
Philippines 8.4 7.4 n.a.
South Korea 2.0 2.6 4.7
Thailand n.a. 1.1 4.4
Source: ILO.96
Table 1.8. International interest rates
1980-87 1988-95 1996 1997
LIBOR 6m 5.8 3.0 3.3 3.9
LTIRAC (1) n.a. n.a 6.8 6.1
STIRAC (2) n.a. n.a. 4.1 4.0
LTWRIR (3) 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.1
Notes: (1) Long-term interest rate in advanced economies; (2) Short-term interest rate in advanced
economies; (3) Long-term world real interest rate.
Source: IMF (1998), tables A18 and A45.
Table 1.9. GDP growth in the advanced economies
1995 1996 1997
Adv. economies 2.5 2.7 3.0
United States 2.0 2.8 3.8
Japan 1.5 3.9 0.9
European Union 2.5 1.7 2.6
Dev. Economies 6.0 6.6 5.8
World average 3.6 4.1 4.1
Source: IMF (1998), table A1.
Table 1.10. World commodity prices in US dollars (% of change)
1988-95 1996 1997
Oil -0.7 18.9 -6.0
Non-oil 3.8 -1.3 -1.7
Source: IMF (1998), table A45.
Table 1.11. Growth in world trade
1988-95 1996 1997
World volume 6.7 6.6 9.4
Imp. Of adv. eco. 6.4 6.4 8.6
Imp. Of dev. Eco. 7.9 9.3 12.1
Source: IMF (1998), table A45.97
Table 1.12. Currency real appreciation (cumulative percentage)
Dec90/Dec94 Dec94/March97 Dec90/March97
Indonesia 8 18 25
Malaysia 14 16 25
Philippines 38 15 47
South Korea 9 2 11
Thailand 11 16 25
Source: Radelet and Sachs (1998), table 10.
Table 1.13. US dollar nominal exchange rate (respective to the yen and DM)
1995 1996 1997
Yen 94.1 108.8 121.0
D-Mark 4.99 5.12 5.84
 Source: IMF (1998), table A19.
Table 1.14. Growth rates of merchandise exports
1994 1995 1996 1997
Indonesia 8.8 13.4 10.4 11.6
Malaysia 24.7 26.0 6.7 -7.2
Philippines 19.9 31.6 17.5 12.2
South Korea 16.8 30.3 5.3 7.3
Thailand 22.7 25.1 -1.3 3.5
Source: World Bank.98
Table 1.15. Current account (as a percentage of GDP)
1990-1995 1996 1997
Indonesia -2.5 -3.4 -1.4
Malaysia -5.8 -5.0 -5.3
Philippines -3.7 -4.7 -5.3
South Korea -1.2 -4.7 -2.0
Thailand -3.9 -7.9 -2.0
Singapore 0.6 15.4 15.4
Hong Kong, China - - -
Taiwan 4.2 4.0 2.7
China 1.2 0.9 3.2
Source: ADB (1999), table 1.2.
Table 1.16. Bank lending to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP)
1980 1990 1996 D D90/80 D D96/90
Indonesia 8 45 55 12 10
Malaysia 33 71 93 37 22
Philippines 31 19 49 38 30
South Korea 36 52 62 16 10
Thailand 9 64 102 53 38
Sources: Bisignano (1999) and Glick (1998), table 2.
Table 1.17. Investment efficiency (investment rate/GDP growth)










Indonesia 33.6 31.4 6.9 8.1 4.87 3.88
Malaysia 36.0 42.5 8.7 9.0 4.14 4.72
Philipp. 22.7 23.1 1.9 5.3 11.9 4.36
S. Korea 36.7 37.7 7.6 8.0 4.83 4.71
Thailand 40.9 41.7 9.0 4.2 4.54 5.79
Source: IFS and author’s calculation.99





South Korea 3.8 4.9
Thailand 3.4 5.1
Singapore 3.6 4.2
Hong Kong 3.7 6.1
Taiwan 2.4 3.9
China 3.1 2.9
Source: JP Morgan and Corsetti et al. (1998), table 6.
Table 1.19. Foreign liabilities of  deposit money banks (as % of GDP)
End 1990 End 1993 End 1996
Indonesia 6 6 6
Malaysia 7 19 9
Philippines 6 6 17
South Korea 4 4 9
Thailand 5 11 27
Source: Glick (1998), table 2.






Source: Glick (1998), table 2.100





South Korea 16.0 22.5
Thailand 15.0 25.0
Hong Kong 1.5 3.0
Singapore 2.0 3.5
Source: JP Morgan and Chowdury (1999), table 12.
Table 1.22. Debt-to-equity ratios in East Asian corporates, 1988-1996
1994 1995 1996 1988-1996
Indonesia 1.661 2.115 1.878 1.951
Malaysia 0.991 1.103 1.176 0.908
Philippines 1.148 1.150 1.285 1.129
South Korea 3.530 3.776 3.545 3.467
Thailand 2.126 2.224 2.361 2.008
United States 1.006 1.099 1.125 1.034
Germany 1.512 1.485 1.472 1.514
Japan 2.193 2.367 2.374 2.302
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998), table 6.
Table 1.23. Short-term foreign debt/total foreign debt (percentage)
June 1990 June 1994 June 1997
Indonesia 51.6 61.1 59.6
Malaysia 25.6 59.1 56.4
Philippines 33.3 44.1 65.6
South Korea 66.4 72.5 67.8
Thailand 60.1 74.2 65.6
Source: BIS.101








Source: ADB (1999), table 1.3
Table 1.25. M2/international reserves
End 1990 End 1993 Mid 1997
Indonesia 600 603 616
Malaysia 291 209 399
Philippines 497 478 403
South Korea 649 685 620
Thailand 456 403 490
Source: IFS and Glick (1998), table 4.
Table 1.26. Stockmarket indexes (1 June 1996 = 100)
28 June 1996 1 January 1997 30 June 1997 30 March 1998
Indonesia 114 120 133 28
Malaysia 116 125 109 51
Philippines 127 122 108 62
South Korea 97 64 42 24
Thailand 89 68 74 31
Source: Datastream.102
Table 1.27. Net private capital flows to Asia-5 (US$ billion)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Equity 15.3 18.6 4.4 13.7 18.5
  FDI (1) 4.2 4.7 5.9 9.5 12.5
  PI (2) 11.0 13.9 -1.5 4.3 6.0
Priv. Credit. 65.1 83.7 -4.2 -41.3 -18.2
  CB (3) 53.2 62.7 -21.2 -36.1 -16.0
  NBPC (4) 12.0 21.0 17.1 -5.3 -2.3
Total 80.4 102.3 0.2 -27.6 0.3
Notes: (1) Foreign direct investment; (2) Portfolio investment; (3) Commercial banks; (4) Non-bank
private creditors.
Source: IIF (1999).103
Table 3.1. Capital flows since 1870 (average absolute value of current account
as percent of GDP)
UK USA Argentina Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan
1870-1889 4.6 0.7 18.7 8.2 7.0 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.6
1890-1913 4.6 1.0 6.2 4.1 7.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.4
1919-1926 2.7 1.7 4.9 4.2 2.5 2.8 2.4 4.2 2.1
1927-1931 1.9 0.7 3.7 5.9 2.7 1.4 2.0 1.5 0.6
1932-1939 1.1 0.4 1.6 1.7 2.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0
1947-1959 1.2 0.6 2.3 3.4 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.3
1960-1973 0.8 0.5 1.0 2.3 1.2 0.6 1.0 2.1 1.0
1974-1989 1.5 1.4 1.9 3.6 1.7 0.8 2.1 1.3 1.8
1989-1996 2.6 1.2 2.0 4.5 4.0 0.7 2.7 1.6 2.1
Source: Baldwin and Martin (1999), table 5.
Table 3.2. Geographical distribution of FDI, 1914-1996. Various home and host
nations.
1914 1960 1996
% of world stock % of origin % of host % of origin % of host % of origin % of host
USA 18.5 10.3 49.2 13.9 25.0 19.9
Canada 1.0 5.7 3.8 23.7 3.5 4.0
UK 45.5 1.4 16.2 9.2 11.2 10.7
Germany 10.5 1.2 9.1 5.3
France 12.2 6.1 6.5 5.2
Belgium 1.9 2.3 3.1
Italy 1.6 3.7 2.3
Netherlands 10.5 5.8 3.7







Russia 2.1 7.1 na na 0.0 0.2
Developing
nations
nil 62.8 1.0 32.3 8.9 28.4
Source: Baldwin and Martin (1999), table 15.104
Table 3.3. Annual Capital Net Flows (all developing countries)
1978-82 1983-89 1990 1991 1992 1993
US$ billion 40.5 45.8 61.8 149.1 125.0 169.9
% Exports 8.6 9.8 9.3 22.2 17.0 22.1
Net capital
flows
% GNP 2.3 1.9 2.4 5.4 4.0 5.3
US$ billion 8.3 11.5 19.7 27.1 34.7 52.6
% Exports 1.8 2.4 3.0 4.0 4.7 6.9
Net direct
investment
% GNP 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.7
US$ billion 1.7 5.1 20.0 36.0 44.2 97.1
% Exports 0.4 1.0 3.0 5.4 6.0 12.7
Net portfolio
investment
% GNP 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.3 1.4 3.0
US$ billion 30.5 29.2 22.1 85.9 46.1 20.2
% Exports 6.4 6.4 3.3 12.8 6.3 2.6
Net other
investment
% GNP 1.7 1.2 0.8 3.1 1.5 0.6
1994 1995 1996 1997 1990-97
US$ billion 144.0 180.3 193.6 135.7 144.9
% Exports 16.6 17.5 16.8 10.8 16.5
Net capital
flows
% GNP 4.1 4.7 4.7 2.9 4.2
US$ billion 76.5 86.5 108.5 126.5 66.5
% Exports 8.8 8.4 9.4 10.1 6.9
Net direct
investment
% GNP 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.7 1.8
US$ billion 85.7 22.2 52.7 55.5 51.7
% Exports 9.8 2.1 4.6 4.4 6.0
Net portfolio
investment
% GNP 2.5 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.5
US$ billion -18.2 71.6 32.4 -46.3 26.7
% Exports -2.1 6.9 2.8 -3.7 3.6
Net other
investment
% GNP -0.5 1.9 0.8 -1.0 0.9
Source: IMF in López-Mejía (1999), table 3.105
Table 3.4. Annual net private capital flows (by region)
1978-82 1983-89 1990 1991 1992 1993
US$ billion 18.3 17.2 48.9 124.8 108.2 151.4
% Exports 3.9 3.7 7.4 18.6 14.7 19.7
All
developing
countries % GNP 0.8 0.7 1.6 3.9 3.1 3.9
US$ billion 6.4 2.6 -1.9 1.2 0.2 3.7
% Exports 7.7 3.2 -1.8 1.2 0.2 3.8
Africa
% GNP 2.0 0.8 -0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0
US$ billion 7.6 12.9 27.5 32.2 20.9 54.3
% Exports 9.8 10.7 13.5 14.0 7.9 18.0
Asia
% GNP 1.2 1.5 2.6 2.9 1.7 3.7
US$ billion -24.8 3.3 9.2 65.9 31.3 30.3
% Exports -12.2 2.3 4.9 38.0 16.4 16.4
Middle East
and Europe
% GNP -5.3 0.7 1.5 11.7 5.0 4.9
US$ billion 29.1 -1.5 14.1 25.5 55.9 63.1
% Exports 28.9 -1.3 8.5 15.4 32.1 34.4
Western
Hemisphere
% GNP 3.9 -0.2 1.3 2.2 4.5 4.6
1994 1995 1996 1997 1990-97
US$ billion 133.4 147.6 189.6 139.0 130.4
% Exports 15.3 14.3 16.4 11.1 14.7
All
developing
countries % GNP 3.3 3.2 3.7 2.5 3.1
US$ billion 9.2 10.5 5.4 14.0 5.3
% Exports 9.1 8.9 4.1 10.3 4.5
Africa
% GNP 2.5 2.4 1.1 2.7 1.2
US$ billion 64.3 91.2 98.3 28.8 52.2
% Exports 17.5 20.1 19.4 5.2 14.5
Asia
% GNP 4.1 4.9 4.6 1.3 3.2
US$ billion 13.4 7.7 4.2 8.7 21.3
% Exports 7.0 3.6 1.7 3.4 11.4
Middle East
and Europe
% GNP 2.3 1.2 0.6 1.1 3.5
US$ billion 46.5 38.2 81.8 87.5 51.6
% Exports 22.2 15.5 29.9 29.2 23.4
Western
Hemisphere
% GNP 3.0 2.3 4.5 4.4 3.4
Source: IMF in López-Mejía (1999), table 1.106
Table 3. 5.  Short-term real interest rates
a
Annual rates of return
1990-94 1995 1996 1997 Q1
China
b -2.2 -5.0 0.7 2.2
India
c 2.2 5.7 4.9 -2.7
Hong Kong -3.7 -2.7 -0.8 -0.4
Taiwan
d 3.3 2.5 2.3 3.9
Singapore 1.1 0.8 1.5 1.2
Korea 2.2 4.2 2.4 2.7
Indonesia 8.3 6.7 8.7 11.3
Malaysia 2.7 2.5 3.5 3.9
Philippines 5.0 3.4 3.6 5.8
Thailand 5.3 5.5 4.3 5.1
Argentina -12.4 8.2 7.2 6.2
Brazil
c 10.6 25.5 10.3 12.7
Chile 6.6 5.9 6.9 6.8
Colombia 0.1 9.5 8.5 5.7
Mexico 3.3 9.8 -1.1 -1.8
Peru -12.4 4.3 3.4 5.2
Venezuela -2.5 -22.0 -36.2 -37.8
Source: BIS (1997), Table VI.2.
                                                       
a Rates on three month paper
b One-year deposit rate
c Overnight rate
d Overnight rate and, before November 1994, weighted average of six money
market rates with maturities ranging from overnight to six  months.